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PROTECTING CONSUMERS AND
PROVIDERS UNDER HEALTH
REFORM: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW ISSUES
Eleanor D. Kinneyt
I.

INTRODUfTION

THE PRIVATE MARKET has not been able to provide adequate and affordable health insurance for all Americans
under age sixty-five. About 15 % of Americans have no health
insurance, and many more are underinsured. 1 Recent evidence
suggests that the proportion of Americans covered under health
insurance offered by employers has declined substantially in recent years from 64% in 1991 to 62.5% in 1992.2 These gaps in
health insurance coverage as well as the public's fear of losing
employer-based health insurance were the precipitating factors
in the call for health care reform in the 103d Congress.
President Clinton made comprehensive reform of the nation's health care system a key goal of his presidency. The
President introduced a comprehensive health reform bill in the
103d Congress.' Senators and House members also introduced
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Law and Health, Indiana Univer-

sity School of Law, Indianapolis. B.A., Duke University, 1969; University of Chicago,
1970; J.D., Duke University School of Law, 1973; M.P.H., University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, 1979. The author wishes to thank Phyllis Bonds and Kurt Snyder for their
help with this Article.
1. Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured, Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) Issue Brief, No. 145, Jan. 1994, at 5. See also U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE. A CALL FOR ACTION. S. REP. No. 113,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
2. Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) Issue Brief, supra note 1, at 6. See
also Deborah Chollet, Employer-Based Health Insurance in a Changing Work Force,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 315.
3. American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) [hereinafter Health Security Act of 1993].
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innovative health reform proposals that were considered in tandem with the President's proposal.4 At the close of the 103d
Congress, several senators and House members introduced bills
that promoted compromise among competing proposals.5 (The
major health reform bills of the 103d Congress are presented at
Table 1.) The upcoming 104th Congress with its new Republican majorities in both chambers also may consider health reform legislation along the lines of the Republican bills of the
103d Congress (See Table 1). The President is likely to introduce a bill as well.
TABLE 1
MAJOR HEALTH REFORM BILLS BEFORE THE 103D CONGRESS
MANAGED COMPETITION PROPOSALS

The American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, S.
1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Health Security Act of 1993]. Sponsored by Rep. Gephart, D-MO and Sen.
Mitchell, D-ME for President Clinton.
The Managed Competition Act of 1993, H.R. 3222, S. 1579,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Managed Competition Act of 1993]. Sponsored by Rep. Cooper, D-TN & Sen.
Breaux, D-LA.
Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993, H.R.
3704, S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter
Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993]. Sponsored by Sen. Chafee, R-RI & Rep. Thomas, R-CA.

4. Id.; see, e.g., Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993, H.R. 3704, S.
1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Health Equity and Access Reform Today
Act of 1993]; Managed Competition Act of 1993, H.R. 3222, S. 1579, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Managed Competition Act of 1993]; Consumer Choice Health
Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3698, S. 1743, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Consumer Choice Health Security Act]; Affordable Health Care Now Act of 1993, H.R. 3080,
S. 1533, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Affordable Health Care Now Act];
Comprehensive Family Health Access and Savings Act, H.R. 3918, S. 1807, 103d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Comprehensive Family Health Access and Saving Act of
1993].
5. See, e.g., Health Security Act, S. 2560, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter
Mitchell Compromise Bill]; Health Security Act of 1994, S. 2357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) [hereinafter Health Security Act of 1994]; Health Reform Consensus Act of 1994,
H.R. 3955, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Health Reform Consensus Act]; Bipartisan Health Care Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 5228, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Bipartisan Health Care Reform Act].
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INCENTIVE PROPOSALS

Consumer Choice Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3698, S.
1743, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Consumer
Choice Health Security Act of 1993]. Sponsored by Sen. Nickles, R-OK & Rep. Stearns, R-FL.
Affordable Health Care Now Act of 1993, H.R. 3080, S. 1533,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Affordable Health
Care Now Act]. Sponsored by Rep. Michael, R-IL & Sen.
Lott, R-MS.
Comprehensive Family Health Access and Savings Act, H.R.
3918, S. 1796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Comprehensive Family Health Access and Savings Act]. Sponsored
by Sen. Gramm, R-TX and Rep. Santorum, R-CA.
ALL-PAYER SYSTEM PROPOSALS

The American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 1200, S.
491, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter The American
Health Security Act of 1993]. Sponsored by Rep. McDermott,
D-WA & Sen. Wellstone, D-MN.
1994
Health Security Act, S. 2357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
Sponsored by Sen. Mitchell, ME-D [hereinafter Health Security Act of 1994].
S. 2374, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Dole Compromise Bill]. Sponsored by Sen. Dole, R-KS.
Health Security Act, S. 2560, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
[hereinafter Mitchell Compromise Bill]. Sponsored by Sen.
Mitchell, D-ME.
Health Reform Consensus Act of 1994, H.R. 3955, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Health Reform Consensus
Act]. Sponsored by Rep. Rowland, D-GA.
Bipartisan Health Care Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 5228, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Bipartisan Health Care
Reform Act]. Sponsored by Rep. Rowland, D-GA.
COMPROMISE BILLS, SUMMER

Three models of health reform approaches predominated
in the proposals before the 103d Congress: managed competition, a single-payer system, and reform of the health insurance
market through federal tax and other incentives. The managed
competition approach leaves the current employer-based, private health insurance system in place, while reforming the private health insurance market. The incentive approach attempts
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to expand coverage and accomplish insurance reform voluntarily by encouraging employers and consumers to purchase more
cost-efficient health plans. The single-payer system model severs the link between employment and health insurance with a
government social insurance program for health care expenses
along the lines of the current Medicare program.
Some proposals before the 103d Congress were more regulatory in their approach, particularly with respect to mandating
universal coverage and employer participation and setting
health system expenditure limits, while other proposals relied
on incentives and market forces to expand and finance coverage
and contain costs. Proposals also varied in the allocation of authority among the federal government, state governments, and
private organizations. Nevertheless, regardless of approach and
emphasis, all health reform proposals before the 103d Congress
would have fundamentally altered relationships between the
consumers and providers of health care services and the employers, insurance companies, and governments that pay for
these services. These new roles and responsibilities of the federal government, state governments, as well as new and existing
private organizations implicate important administrative law
issues. 6
This Article focuses on the procedural issues raised by the
various health reform proposals before the 103d Congress that
are the primary concern of administrative law - rulemaking,
adjudication, and judicial review. First, the Article reviews constitutional and administrative law principles that govern the
current health care system and which would govern rulemaking
and adjudication procedures and their judicial review in a reformed system absent explicit statutory change. Then, the Article critiques the provisions for rulemaking, adjudication, and

6. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM (1994) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES
IN HEALTH CARE REFORM]; Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Praise Reform and
Start The Litigation?, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1735 (1993) (stating that any enacted
health care plan must provide administrative remedies sufficient to prevent federal courts
from being overwhelmed by litigation); Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 439 (1993) (discussing new roles of the courts and agencies in implementing health care
reform); Robert Pear, Officials Predict Deluge of Suits On Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1993, at Al, A 14; Robert Pear, U.S. Judges Warn of Health Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 16, 1994, at A13.
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judicial review in the major health reform proposals before the
103d Congress and addresses how procedural arrangements
might be designed to assure expeditious implementation of future health reform legislation while protecting the right of consumers, providers, and other affected persons.
II. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Any health reform proposal will be enacted in the context
of existing principles of law that govern the procedures by
which agencies conduct rulemaking and adjudication and also
govern the way in which private parties, and government, can
obtain judicial review of administrative rules and policies, as
well as orders and decisions, or otherwise enforce provisions of
health reform legislation. These principles of law accord important procedural rights and responsibilities to the federal government, states, and private parties. Consequently, if drafters of
health reform legislation find the current arrangements established in these principles of law unsuitable for a reformed
health care system, they must specify other arrangements in
derogation of these principles of law in the health reform legislation. If, however, principles of constitutional law dictate, then
drafters may not be able to change arrangements by legislation
and must design the health reform around these constraints.
The applicable principles of procedural law will vary according to the type of health insurance plan involved. Consequently, it is crucial to understand the different ways in which
most Americans obtain health insurance in the mix of public
and private programs in the current health care system. Most
Americans under age sixty-five are insured through private
health insurance plans. The federal government provides health
insurance to the aged and severely disabled through the Medicare program.' The federal and state governments, through the
Medicaid program, provide health insurance for the poor on
categorical cash assistance programs, and to other poor individuals with similar characteristics, including children, pregnant
women, and the severely disabled." The Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) in the U.S. Department of Health and

7.
8.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395cc (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Id. §§ 1396-1396(u).
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Human Services (HHS) has federal responsibility for these
programs. States administer the Medicaid program within federal requirements.9 Medicare covers about thirty-four million
people and Medicaid covers about twenty-four million people. 10
The provision of health insurance for most Americans
under age sixty-five is left primarily to the private market.
Under private health insurance plans, the financing of health
care is a matter of private contract between the insurer, the
insured, and in most cases, the sponsor of the health insurance
plan, such as employers or unions. Health plans are offered by
private health insurance companies, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans, health maintenance organizations, or managed
care companies and sold to sponsors of health plans or offered
to individuals. These plans vary from traditional indemnity insurance to prepaid health plans. Two-thirds of employers are
self-insured and offer health plans to their employees without
purchasing them on the private market."
Private health insurance is regulated in several, often inconsistent ways. States regulate plans offered by commercial
insurance companies, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans, and
health maintenance organizations (HMOs). The Department of
Labor (DOL), under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1975 (ERISA),' 2 regulates self-insured plans of employers and unions. ERISA preempts state law that might otherwise regulate self-insured and employee benefit plans.
ERISA provides that employee benefit plans cannot be deemed
as insurance and regulated under the state insurance code.'8
The upshot of this regulatory arrangement is that self-insured

9. Id. § 1396a (requiring state medical assistance programs to meet specific requirements before receiving federal approval).
10. Health Care Financing Admin., Medicare and MedicaidStatisticalSupplement,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 15, 311 (Supp. 1992).
11.

See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL TESTING

AND HEALTH INSURANCE 114 (1988). See also Alan I. Widiss & Larry Gostin, What's

Wrong with the ERISA "Vacuum"?: The Case Against UnrestrictedFreedomfor Employers to Terminate Employee Health Care Plans and to Decide What Coverage is to be
Provided When Risk Retention Plans Are Establishedfor Health Care, 41 DRAKE L REV.
635, 636, n.6 (1992).

12.

Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88

Stat. 829 (1974), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
13. Id. § 1144.
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employer health plans are not covered by state insurance codes
as are employer health plans that purchase health insurance.14
A.

Constitutional Protections

The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution accord rights to procedural due process to individuals affected by adverse governmental action. For procedural due process protections to apply,
there must be state action15 and a protected interest.1 Courts
have consistently held that actions of providers, particularly
physicians, in providing services do not constitute state action
despite governmental support for such services or the provider.17 Regarding the required interest, the Supreme Court
has long recognized that beneficiaries of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs have a protected property interest in these
programs. 8 Providers do not have a recognized property inter-

14. See Mary Ann Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism:Barriers to Increasing Health
Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 255 (1990) (discussing ERISA's
preemption of many state attempts at regulating employee health plans).
15. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that a state's
acquiescence of a private action does not constitute state action); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (holding that wage garnishment by states must follow due
process procedures); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding
that action by a restaurant in a public building did not constitute state action merely because the state was a joint participant in the operation of the restaurant). See also Henry
J. Friendly, The Public-PrivatePenumbra - Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1289 (1982) (discussing that more state involvement is required to produce a holding of
constitutionality in a due process case); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Publicl
PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982) (describing the theoretical distinctions
between public and private issues).
16. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (establishing analysis for procedural
due process requirements); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that the right to a
public education is a protected interest); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (ruling
that welfare benefits constitute a protected interest).
17. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding that actions by a
nursing home cannot be considered state action simply because they did not give adequate
notice to Medicaid recipients about transfers to lower levels of care); Corum v. Beth Israel
Medical Ctr., 373 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (construing statute to compel hospitals to provide a reasonable amount of uncompensated services). But see J.K. v. Dillenberg,
836 F. Supp. 694 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that benefit decisions of a regional health authority managing mental health services under contract to a state Medicaid program could
constitute state action).
18. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1980) (holding
that this interest does not confer a right to continued residence in a nursing home of one's
choice).
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est in Medicare or Medicaid payments. 19 Yet, a 1986 case,
Koerpel v. Heckler,0 ruled that a physician subject to losing
participation in the Medicare program for violations of Medicare program requirements in an action by the HHS Inspector
General did have a colorable liberty interest. It is likely that
consumers and providers would have comparable interests in
health care benefits and program participation respectively
under new health reform legislation.
Further, whether an agency policy or decision is "legislative" or "adjudicative" in nature influences the available legal
remedies in challenges to those policies and decisions. Legislative policies and decisions apply prospectively to large groups
and are generally based on facts that pertain collectively to the
group affected. Adjudicative decisions generally apply to specific individuals and generally pertain to past events and circumstances. The Supreme Court has ruled that due process
protections are quite limited when legislative-type decisions are
involved.21
Federal courts also have recognized that the Procedural
Due Process doctrine requires specific procedures in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Specifically, Medicare beneficiaries are entitled to effective notice of adverse government action, such as a claim or eligibility denial.2" Similarly, Medicaid
19. Id. at 778; St. Francis Hosp. Ctr. v. Heckler, 714 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984) (finding that governmental control over Medicare rates does
not violate providers' due process rights by depriving them of property); Geriatrics, Inc. v.
Harris, 640 F.2d 262, 264-65 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981) (holding
that nursing home's unilateral hope that new provider agreements were to be executed for
state Medicaid program did not constitute a protected property interest).
20. 797 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1986).
21. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (stating that
hearings and individual arguments regarding legislative matters are limited), followed,
U.S. v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (holding that the Administrative Procedure Act only requires "trial-type" hearings for rulemaking when the enabling act specifically specifies an on-the-record hearing); Alaska Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 545
F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that no hearing is required for legislative fact-finding
or rulemaking agency activities); Assoc. of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1165,
1166 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1984) (holding that when a proceeding is
classified as rulemaking by an agency, due process does not demand rigorous hearing
procedures).
22. See, e.g., Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding
that due process mandates that Medicare recipients receive more protection of their benefits than notice and a "paper hearing"); David v. Heckler, 591 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (finding that notice to recipients must be understood by the majority of beneficiaries
who receive them to comply with due process requirements); Dealy v. Heckler, 616 F.
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applicants and recipients are entitled to adequate notice of adverse decisions as a matter of procedural due process. 3 Medicare beneficiaries also are entitled to an informal hearing,
which must be oral only when issues of witness veracity and
credibility are involved.24 The adjudicator must be unbiased
but may be an employee of a private insurance company that
administers the Medicare program. 5
B.

The Law of Rule and Policy Making

According to administrative law theory, Congress or the
legislature "delegates" legislative authority to agencies. 26 Generally, this delegation is an explicit grant of rulemaking authority in the enabling statute.27 Under both federal and state law,
rules that have legislative effect, so-called "legislative" or "substantive" rules, are distinguished by the procedure by which
they were promulgated. The federal Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) 28 and state administrative procedure acts" establish rulemaking procedures that control unless the agency's enabling statute provides otherwise.30

Supp. 880 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (finding that Medicare recipient was entitled to notice and
fair and complete administrative hearing for reconsideration of benefits coverage).
23. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that agencies
revoking federally funded welfare benefits must articulate detailed reasons in pre-termination notices); Easley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Serv., 645 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Ark. 1986)
(holding that the HHS is constitutionally and statutorily required to notify Medicaid recipients of an adverse decision).
24. Gray Panthers, 652 F.2d at 172.
25. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 (1982) (holding that there is a
presumption of impartiality when the Secretary of HHS contracts with private insurance
companies to determine coverage and pay for services and also to conduct some administrative appeal procedures); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, u (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
26. KENNETH C. DAVIS. I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:1 (2d ed. 1978); JACOB STEIN ET AL.. I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.03[l] (1993).
27. STEIN, supra note 26, at § 13.01.
28. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29. See ARTHUR E. BONFIELD. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 1.1.2 (1986)
[hereinafter STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING].
30. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (establishing this principle as a matter of federal law).
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1. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
The federal APA sets forth requirements for legislative
rulemaking under federal law." Section 553 of the APA outlines the procedures that agencies must use to promulgate
"substantive" rules having legislative effect. Informal rulemaking under section 553 basically requires publication of the text
or substance of the proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for
interested parties to comment through submission of written
material. 2 The APA also provides for formal rulemaking using
trial-type hearing and decision procedures in sections 556 and
557 of the APA,33 when the enabling statute requires that the
rulemaking be "on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing. 3 14 Section 553(c) invokes the evidentiary hearing and
decision requirements of sections 556 and 557 of the APA.
Section 553(b)(3)(A) excludes interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice from section 553 rulemaking procedures.
However, the Administrative Conference of the United States
has recommended that agencies publish all interpretive rules of
general applicability before promulgation and, if unfeasible,
publish such rules and policy statements post-adoption to permit public comment irrespective of the requirements of the
APA. 85 The question of what distinguishes a "legislative" rule
from the other rules, for which section 553 rulemaking procedures are not required, is confounding, and has troubled agencies, courts, and scholars since the APA's enactment.3 6 Thus,
31.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See

ADMINISTRATIVE CONFER-

ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING

37-89 (2d ed.

1991) [hereinafter GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING].

32. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See GUIDE TO FEDERAL
AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 31, at 3-4, 47-48.
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See United States v. Florida E.
Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (holding that formal rulemaking provisions are only triggered when there is a specific statutory requirement for an oral hearing on the record).
35. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Interpretive Rules of General Applicability and Statement of General Policy, Recommendation
No. 76-5 (1976).
36. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like - Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41
DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992) (discussing the practical problems with binding the public to nonlegislative agency rulemaking); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381 (1985) [hereinafter Nonlegislative Rulemaking]
(describing the difficulty in distinguishing legislative from nonlegislative rules due to the
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rules and policies promulgated without section 553 procedures
are often challenged because they are "substantive" rules. 7
Further, section 553(b)(3) (B) does not apply to legislative
rules for which the agency can demonstrate that notice and
comment procedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."38 The rule becomes effective thirty
days after final publication unless the agency can demonstrate
that "good cause" necessitates that the legislative rule be effective even without use of notice and comment procedures." In
recent years, agencies have invoked these two "good cause" exemptions to issue legislative rules that are effective immediately
without notice and comment proceedings.4 °
Regarding judicial review of rules and policies, if administrative review is available, challengers must exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding to court. The predominant
model for judicial review of federal agency decisions is explicit
authorization for judicial review and specification of the scope
of review in the federal enabling act. If the statute is silent on
availability of judicial review, the APA explicitly authorizes judicial review and sets forth procedures.41 Further, the challenge
must be brought under a federal procedural statute authorizing

notice and comment requirements for both); Michael Asimow, Public Participationin the
Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1977)
[hereinafter Public Participation] (stating that the bright lines distinguishing interpretive

rules and legislative rules policy statements have become "blurred and indistinct"); Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Rules - Interpretive, Legislative and Retroactive, 57 YALE
L. 919 (1948) (asserting that the distinction between legislative and interpretative rules is

unclear).
37. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, supra note 36 (contending that federal agencies

violate the APA and dishonor our system of limited government when they use nonlegislative documents such as "interpretive rules, policy statements, guidances, manuals, and the
like" to bind the public); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking, supra note 36
(contending that regulatory reform proposals at both the federal and state levels which

require agencies to employ notice and comment procedures before adopting nonlegislative
rules would discourage agencies from adopting nonlegislative rules and therefore dramati-

cally disserve the public interest).
38.
39.
40.
emption,

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Id.
See Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act's "Good Cause" Ex36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113 (1984) (arguing good cause exceptions should be used

only when formulating narrow solutions for the most significant and pressing problems and
public reaction should be allowed after enactment); Catherine J. Lanctot, Note, The
"Good Cause" Exceptions: Danger to Notice and Comment Requirements Under the Ad-

ministrativeProcedure Act, 68 GEo. L.J. 765, 771-77 (1980) (outlining the ways in which
the courts have applied the good cause exceptions).
41. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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a cause of action, such as an action for injunctive or declaratory relief, or mandamus.4
It should be emphasized that the Supreme Court's decision
in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 43 sharply limits judicial review of the content of agency
policies where Congress has not directly addressed the issue
specifically. Chevron limits the judicial inquiry to whether the
agency's interpretation "is based on a permissible construction
of the statute" and thus constitutes a reasonable policy
44
choice.
2.

State Administrative Procedure Acts

Most states have state administrative procedure acts that
establish rulemaking procedures for legislative rules which also
govern if the enabling statute is silent. Many state APA
rulemaking procedures are not always as streamlined as informal rulemaking under the federal APA. Many states impose
oral hearing requirements for their informal rulemaking procedures.45 Some allow for appeals by disappointed parties of rules
to administrative law judges.4 6 These additional procedures
limit the ability of state agencies to promulgate rules expeditiously, an important factor to consider when imposing implementation obligations on states with respect to health reform.
For example, such problems with state rulemaking procedures
have posed difficulties for states and the federal government in
the implementation of federal mandates in the Medicaid program. Most state APAs do authorize the promulgation of
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (injunctive relief); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988) (declaratory relief); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (mandamus).
43. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding where Congress is silent or ambiguous as to
the scope of judicial review to be given to an agency's actions, courts must defer to an
agency's interpretation if it is a permissible construction of the statute).
44. Id.; see Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM L.
REV.2071 (1990) (discussing the reach of Chevron and the scope of limitation on judicial
review of agency policies).
45. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.15 (3d ed. 1991); STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING, supra note 29, §§ 6.4-6.6.
46. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.14-14.25 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 34.05.410-.479 (West 1990).
47. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
Rulemaking and Policymaking in the Medicaid Program, Recommendation No. 90-8, 55
Fed. Reg. 53,269, 53,273 (1990) (recommending that Congress allow states to follow their
own rulemaking procedures before complex Medicaid program changes occur on the state
level). See Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A
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rules to have immediate effect on an emergency basis.48 Also,
most state APAs authorize the promulgation of rules on an expedited basis to implement federal mandates. 49 Generally, judicial review of state administrative rules is available.50
C. The Law of Adjudication
Under the current health care system, there are a variety
of systems for adjudicating a wide range of consumer, provider,
and insurer disputes with government and other responsible entities. The pertinent law on the specific procedures for adjudicating disputes depends on the type of health insurance plan
involved. Most disputes between private organizations, such as
consumers and commercial health insurers, are currently resolved in state court. State courts adjudicate disputes under
state regulated health insurance plans.
ERISA sets forth procedures for employer self-insured
plans.5 1 The Social Security Act sets forth procedures for adjudicating Medicare and, to a lesser extent, Medicaid program
claims. 2 Neither the Social Security Act nor ERISA relies on
the evidentiary hearing procedures set forth in the federal APA
that otherwise apply when an enabling statute calls for an onthe-record hearing in an adjudicative proceeding.53 Customarily, government benefit programs have not invoked APA procedures for evidentiary hearings in sections 556 and 557 probably due in part to the historical fact that constitutional
protections were not accorded the "privilege" of government
benefits until the 1970s. 4
Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 861-64 (1990) [hereinafter Kinney, A

Challenge to Federalism] (noting that state procedures often create substantial delays in
the implementation of new federal policy).
48.

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, supra note 45, at § 4.15.

49. Id.
50. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING, supra note 29, §§ 9.1-9.3.
51. See notes 59-73 infra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 74-99 infra (Medicare) and notes 100-10 (Medicaid) and accompany-

ing text. See Adjudicatory Procedures of the Dep't of Health and Human Services: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the

House of Rep. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. (March 23, 1989 and June
27, 1989).
53.

5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

54. See, e.g., William V. Alstyne, Cracks In "The New Property".Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV.445, 445-46 (1977); Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (discussing the effect of the growth of
government on the historical conception of government benefits as privileges).
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1. State Regulated Health Plans
For health plans regulated under state law, consumer and
provider disputes are basically adjudicated in state courts as
matters of state contract law as modified by state statutory and
common law governing insurance.55 An important common law
theory for recovery in coverage disputes between beneficiaries
and insurance companies are actions for "bad faith breach" of
the insurance contract, which provides tort, as well as contract
remedies, when insurers act in bad faith in rejecting a claim. 56
Some states have experimented with the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques in lieu of trial in the common law tort system.5 7 Under current law, the disposition of a
matter by a state court is final unless a federal constitutional
question is raised in the matter. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. section
1257 authorizes Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear final judgments of the highest court in a state to adjudicate the matter in
question. "8 Consequently, lower federal courts do not have authority to review state agency decisions on state insurance law
issues absent a specific congressional mandate to do so.
2. Employer, Self-Insured Plans
For employer self-insured plans regulated under ERISA,
administrative appeals procedures for consumers are set forth
55. See generally ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS. INSURANCE LAW A GUIDE
TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES (2d Ed.
1988) (discussing fundamental principles and legal doctrines that comprise the law of insurance); see also Jordan v. Group Health Ass'ns, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (discussing the applicability of insurance regulatory statutes to group health plans).
56. See, e.g., Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 775 F.2d 1457 (11 th Cir.
1985) (addressing tort and contractual elements of a bad faith claim and dismissing the
claim on summary judgment); Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P.2d 267, 277 (Cal.
1987) (finding bad faith breach by insurer who does not inform insured of right to peer
review and arbitration after denial of benefits).
57. See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL.. DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985) (discussing the growth of alternative dispute resolution since the 1960s).
Mandatory ADR has been upheld as constitutional in most judicial challenges. Dwight
Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues,
68 ORE. L. REV. 487, 546 (1989) (stating that state courts have interpreted their constitutions consistently with federal due process doctrines to uphold the use of mandatory ADR).
58. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (finding that a
state case raising a federal constitutional question falls under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948) (holding that a claim of federal right
may proceed to federal court unless the claimant waives his or her right by failing to follow
state procedure).
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in the ERISA statute.59 Specifically, ERISA section 503 requires employee benefit plans to establish adequate notice procedures for denied benefits "written in a manner calculated to
be understood by the participants" according to specifications
in DOL regulations,6 and to afford participants a reasonable
opportunity for review of the claim denial decision before the
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the
claim."' DOL regulations outline detailed requirements for notice, evidentiary hearings, and decisions of plans regarding denied claims. 2
The ERISA statute provides broad opportunities for judicial review of plan decisions on claims and other matters, generally following consideration of the dispute by the plan under
section 503.63 Specifically, under ERISA section 502(a), a plan
participant or beneficiary may sue in federal district court to
recover benefits under the plan, to enforce participant rights
under the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits.64 Relief
may be accrued through benefits due, a declaratory judgment
on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a plan ad59. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
60. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2560-2603 (1994).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that the intent of Congress in establishing these notice and
hearing procedures before plans was to minimize litigation over consumer disputes with
plans); Belasco v. W.K.P. Wilson & Sons, Inc., 833 F.2d 277 (11th Cir. 1987); Motley v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Company, 834 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Kan. 1993).
62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that a participant in a federally regulated employee benefits plan who brought an action against an employer alleging she was discharged in order to prevent her from obtaining rights under the plan was not required to exhaust administrative remedies); Amato
v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that union member's claim against
trustees of union pension trust and others was based purely on the interpretation or application of the terms of the plan rather than on statutory rights, and thus the claimant is
required to exhaust the plan's claims procedure before filing suit); Riley v. Dow Corning
Corp., 767 F. Supp. 735 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that a wrongful discharge action was
in bad faith); Vogel v. Independence Fed. Say. Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1990)
(holding that an employer had breached its fiduciary duty in terminating medical coverage
even though it terminated coverage for all employees when family members of an insured
employee under a group health plan brought an action against an employer, health insurer,
and insurance agency alleging violations of ERISA and state law); Skrobacz v. International Harvester, 582 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. i11.1984) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required when union members brought ERISA action against employer
for alleged violations of collective bargaining agreement and for failure to pay required
benefits under retirement plan).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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ministrator's improper refusal to pay benefits.6 5 In Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court ruled that
federal district courts have de novo review under ERISA section 503 for plan denials of benefits. 66 ERISA remedies are exclusive, and ERISA preempts state common law remedies including actions for bad faith breach of contract for wrongful
denial of claims.67
Provider disputes in plans regulated under ERISA are adjudicated as private contract claims under state law, as are provider disputes for state regulated health plans.68 However,
providers have sought to challenge plan decisions in health insurance cases with some very limited success.69
A most troubling development in the law of ERISA-regulated plans is the Supreme Court's decision upholding the right
of an employer with a self-insured plan to limit benefits under
its plan. Specifically, the Supreme Court in McGann v. H & H
70
Music Co.

refused to reverse a federal appellate court deci-

sion upholding an employer's right to limit health insurance
benefits for a particular condition such as AIDS, even though
the employer had an employee with AIDS who sustained
sharply reduced health insurance benefits as a result of this decision. Other federal appellate courts have rendered similar de-

65. Id. The Supreme Court has recently curtailed the ability of plan participants to
obtain extra contractual damages, such as might be awarded in a common law bad faith
claim. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 948 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2063
(1993) (ruling that ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B)(i), an equitable relief authority, did not permit
recovery of monetary damages). See also Richard Rouco, Comment, Available Remedies
Under ERISA Section 502(A), 45 ALA. L. REv. 631 (1994).
66. 489 U.S. 101 (1989); see Douglas Holdren, Denial of Benefit Claims Under
ERISA: The Rise and Fall of De Novo Review, 36 VILL. L. RaV. 1219 (1991).
67. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-51 (1987) (holding that
common law actions for bad faith breach based upon improper processing of benefit claims
are preempted by ERISA); see. also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 67
(1987) (holding that complaints for state causes of action in state court can be removed to
federal court under ERISA). See generally E. Thomas Bishop & Paula Denny, Hello

ERISA, Good-Bye Bad Faith: FederalPre-Emptionof DTPA, Insurance Code, and Common Law Bad Faith Claims, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 267 (1989).
68. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
69. See David P. Kallus, ERISA: Do Health Care ProvidersHave Standing to Bring
a Civil Enforcement Action under Section 1132(a)?, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 173 (1990).
70. 742 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992) (holding it is not illegal
under ERISA for an employer to restrict possible AIDS claims in a discrimination suit nor
a violation of rights under ERISA after the employer changed portions of a group medical
plan, reducing the maximum benefits for AIDS patients from $1 million to $5000).
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cisions permitting maximum employer flexibility in defining
benefits and coverage under employer, self-insured plans.71
There is some question about the degree of flexibility that
employers actually have to structure benefits and coverage particularly for existing employees with particular medical conditions in light of the Americans with Disabilities Act.7 2 Recently, in Carparts Distribution v. Automotive Wholesaler's
Association of New England, the First Circuit overruled the
dismissal of a complaint in which an AIDS victim claimed that
the health plan's restrictive coverage provision for AIDS-related medical expenses violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act.13 This case, while raising the issue only collaterally, does
suggest that employers may not have as much latitude as
before in crafting restrictive coverage provisions for specific illnesses in self-insured plans regulated under ERISA.
3. The Medicare Program
BENEFICIARY APPEALS. The Medicare statute specifies several administrative appeals systems for beneficiaries dissatisfied
with determinations under Parts A and B of the Medicare program.74 Under Medicare Part A, which funds inpatient hospital
and related post-hospital services, beneficiaries may appeal a

71. See, e.g., Owens v. Storehouse, Inc. 773 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1991), aff'd,
984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that an employer's unilateral modification of a
health benefit plan could not support a claim for a violation of an ERISA statute preventing employers from discharging or harassing employees in order to keep them from obtaining benefits to which they are entitled); Vogel v. Independence Fed. Say. Bank, 738 F.
Supp. 1210, 1225 (D. Md. 1990) (requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that employer had
specific intent to violate ERISA in order to establish a prima facie case under ERISA
§ 510). See also Jeffrey R. Pettit, Help! We've Fallen and We Can't Get Up: The
Problems Families Face Because of Employment-Based Health Insurance, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 779 (1993).
72. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993)).
73. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that an association and trust could be an
employer under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when a trade association member and employee brought a state court action to challenge a decision of a trade
association and the administering trust for a health benefit plan that limited the lifetime
benefits for illnesses related to AIDS); see also, Larry Gostin, Update: The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct and the U.S. Health System, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1992, at 248.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ff, 1395u (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Eleanor D. Kinney, The
Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a
Time of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 39-53 (1986) [hereinafter Kinney, The Medicare
Appeals System].
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denied claim, after reconsideration by the intermediary, to a
Social Security administrative law judge (ALJ) if the amount
in controversy is at least $100, and the beneficiary then subsequently may appeal to the Social Security Appeals Council and
seek judicial review.7 6 For Part B, which pays for physician and
other outpatient services, beneficiaries may appeal to a HCFA
ALJ for claims involving at least $500 and above, and following Appeals Council review, may obtain judicial review of
claims involving $1000 and above.7 Smaller claims are adjudicated by the Medicare contractors. 8
The Medicare appeals system for HMO beneficiaries is especially instructive for health reform.79 The Medicare statute
requires HMOs that contract with Medicare to "provide meaningful procedures" for hearing and resolving grievances between the HMO and Medicare members.80 A Medicare enrollee who is "dissatisfied by reason of his failure to receive any
health service to which he believes he is entitled and at no
greater charge than he believes he is required to pay" has the
right to administrative review for controversies over $100 under
the Social Security Act. 81 If the amount in controversy is
$1000 or above, the enrollee or HMO is entitled to judicial review under the Social Security Act.8
Medicare regulations distinguish between disputes to be
handled under the "meaningful grievance procedures" and
those subject to administrative and judicial review. 83 Specifically, only disputes that fall within the definition of an "initial
determination" in the regulations, such as HMO determinations of non-coverage, are subject to administrative and judicial
review. Upon making an "initial determination," the HMO
must notify the affected Medicare enrollee of his or her right to

75. 42 C.F.R. § 405.710 (1993).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
77. Id. § 1395ff(b)(2)(B).
78. Id. § 1395u; 42 C.F.R. § 405.801 (1993).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 C.F.R. § 417.600-.638
(1993). See Susan J. Stayn, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures,94 COLUM L REV
1674, 1692-1701 (1994) (analyzing the Medicare HMO grievance and appeal process).

80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
81. Id. § 1395mm(c)(5)(B).
82.
83.

Id.
42 C.F.R. § 417 (1993).
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seek reconsideration within sixty days of receipt of the notice.8 4
After reconsideration by the HMO, the HMO must send a
written explanation of an unfavorable decision for HCFA to
reconsider the decision.85 A dissatisfied Medicare enrollee can
then appeal to a Social Security ALJ within sixty days of the
decision, with subsequent Appeals Council and judicial
review.88
PROVIDER APPEALS. The Provider Reimbursement Review
Board (PRRB) adjudicates payment disputes of $10,000 or
more arising between institutional providers and the Medicare
program." The Secretary of HHS may reverse, affirm, or modify the Board's decision.88 Judicial review is available in federal
district court. 89 Hospitals also can appeal determinations of
components of their rate formula under the Medicare prospective payment system to the recently created Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board.90
There are important limits on provider appeal rights under
Medicare. Specifically, providers cannot appeal decisions regarding coverage of benefits accorded beneficiaries.9 1 Nor can
hospitals appeal components of the national prospective payment rate, including the establishment of Diagnosis Related
Groups (DRGs), the methodology for classifying patient discharges, and appropriate weighing factors for DRGs.92 The rationale for this preclusion is protecting the "necessity of main'93
taining a workable payment system.

84. Id. § 417.608.
85. Currently, HCFA's reconsideration function is carried out by a contractor, Network Design Group (NDG). NDG is a private organization comprised of health professionals capable of reviewing medical records involved in disputes.
86. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
87.

42 U.S.C. § 1395o(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 42 C.F.R. § 405.1835 (1993).

The provider's fiscal intermediary adjudicates appeals under $10,000. 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.1811 (1993). See Phyllis E. Bernard, Social Security and Medicare Adjudications
at HHS: Two Approaches to Administrative Justice in an Ever-Expanding Bureaucracy, 3

HEALTH MATRIX 339, 412-20 (1993) (recommending the establishment of a Social Security court to help ease the burden federal courts will face when "baby boomers" become
eligible to make claims on Social Security entitlement programs).
88.

42 U.S.C. § 1395o(f)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).

89. Id.
90. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,

§

Pub. L. No. 101-1239,

6003(h)(3), 103 Stat. 2154-56 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 ww(d)(10) (Supp. IV

1992)).
91.
92.

42 U.S.C. § 1395o(g)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Id. § 1395o(g).

93. H. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 143, pt. 1 (1983).
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Further, physicians and suppliers of medical equipment
have appeal rights under Part B only if they accept assignment
of Part B benefits from beneficiaries. 9 ' Under the resource
based relative value payment system for physicians, administrative and judicial review of the content of relative value scales
used to establish payment rates for physicians is also precluded.95 As with hospital payment, Congress created a congressional commission, the Physician Payment Review Commission, to review and comment on HCFA's payment rates and
methodologies on physicians. 6
JUDICIAL REVIEW. Judicial review for all disputes under
Medicare are limited by the bar to federal question jurisdiction9 7 in section 205(h) of the Social Security Act (SSA) 98 for
all suits under the SSA except when brought in the context of
claims for which administrative remedies have been exhausted. 9 This jurisdictional bar has served as an effective bar-

However, as a check on HCFA's authority to recalibrate DRGs and set hospital payment rates, Congress created the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission to monitor
and evaluate HHS's performance in setting payment rates and, specifically, to analyze the
hospital payment rates and DRGs independently of HHS and to advise HHS of its findings. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(e)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See Eleanor D. Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under the Medicare Prospective Payment System: One Administrative
Model for Allocating Medical Resources Under a Government Health InsuranceProgram,
19 IND. L. REv. 1151 (1986).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(B)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
95. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6102, 103
Stat. 2106, 2184) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(l)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992)).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-I (Supp. IV 1992).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
99. In its 1975 decision, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the Supreme
Court held that federal courts do not have federal jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the Social Security Act, except in the context of claims that have proceeded
through all administrative remedies. Later in Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 612-15
(1984), the Supreme Court ruled that § 205(h) expressly precluded federal question jurisdiction for direct challenges under the Medicare provisions of the SSA. In its 1986 decision, Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 674-78 (1986), the
Supreme Court ruled that SSA § 205(h) did not bar challenges to HHS policies prescribing the method of calculating payment of Part B claims. After this decision, Congress
authorized administrative and judicial review of Part B claims in a manner comparable to
Part A claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Several courts have since
ruled that Part B claims, including challenges to policy, fall within Ringer and that Michigan Academy no longer governs Part B appeals. See, e.g., Abbey v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 37
(2d Cir.), reh'g denied, No. 92-6055 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that Medicare claimant was
not entitled to mandamus relief because not all administrative remedies were exhausted);
National Kidney Patients Ass'n v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 966 (1993) (holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to preliminarily enjoin HHS and that the Department could apply its recoupment procedures in
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rier to federal court for both Medicare beneficiaries and providers and has limited adjudication of disputes to administrative
tribunals created under the SSA.
4. The Medicaid Program
Under the Medicaid statute, state Medicaid plans must
provide for an opportunity for a fair hearing before the state
agency for individuals whose claims are either denied or not
acted on with reasonable promptness, or where the agency otherwise acted erroneously.100 States must maintain a hearing
system that provides for a hearing before the state Medicaid
agency, or an evidentiary hearing at the local level, with a right
0 The hearings provided
of appeal to a state agency hearing. 11
under the state's hearing system must meet the due process
standards in Goldberg v. Kelly, 02 and additional standards
specified in the regulations. 03
Medicaid HMOs are all required to maintain "an internal
grievance procedure," approved by the state Medicaid agency,
which provides for prompt resolution of disputes, and "the participation of individuals with authority to require corrective action.' 0 4 Otherwise, HMO appeal procedures are the state "fair
hearing" procedures described above. 0 5 Provided that states
meet these minimal requirements, states have considerable latitude to structure appeal procedures for their Medicaid
programs.
JUDICIAL REVIEW. The SSA is silent on the availability of
judicial review for decisions of state Medicaid agencies in adjudications of disputes with consumers and providers over claims.
Consequently, claimants are left with the avenues for judicial
106
review under relevant federal and state law.

seeking refund of overpayments made to health care services provider under injunction).
But see Griffith v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D. Mass. 1988) (specifically holding that
Michigan Academy still governs Part B appeals).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 C.F.R. § 431.200-.250
(1993).
101. 42 C.F.R. § 431.205 (1993).
102. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a welfare recipient was entitled to an oral
pretermination hearing).
103. 42 C.F.R. § 431.205(d) (1993).
104. Id. § 434.32(c).
105. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
106. See part III.D.
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Traditionally, Medicaid claimants and providers were severely hampered in their access to federal courts because of the
prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment and limits on challenges under section 1983.107 However, Medicaid providers and
beneficiaries obtained an important victory in terms of opening
up judicial challenge to state Medicaid program policies in Virginia Hospital Association v. Wilder."0 8 In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Boren Amendment 0 9 creates a
right, enforceable in a private cause of action by health care
providers, for declaratory and injunctive relief under section
1983 to have states adopt reasonable and adequate rates.
D.

Statutory and Constitutional Law Pertaining to Judicial
Review

The law of judicial review of the policies and decisions of
administrative agencies is fairly straightforward in the current
health care system. If the matter arises in the context of a
health insurance program, such as decisions regarding coverage
and payment of claims, the availability of judicial review depends on the sponsor of the claimant's health insurance plan.
Judicial review of claim disputes under governmental health insurance programs is discussed above. Other challenges over
governmental actions regarding health-related matters are governed by the body of federal and state procedural and constitutional law outlined below. Regarding judicial review of agency
actions generally, the Federal APA as well as most state administrative procedure acts provide a mechanism for judicial

107. Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See, e.g., Kinney, A
Challenge to Federalism,supra note 47; Rand E. Rosenblatt, Statutory Interpretationand
Distributive Justice: Medicaid Hospital Reimbursement and the Debate over Public
Choice, 35 ST. Louis U. L. J. 793 (1991).
108. 496 U.S. 498 (1990). See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
In the 1980s, Congress revised federal requirements for state payment methodologies
for institutional providers, enabling states to depart from cost reimbursement to more efficient payment methodologies based on the criterion that payment rates be "reasonable and
adequate" to meet the costs of "efficiently and economically operated facilities." Id. In the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 962(b), 94 Stat. 2651 (1980),
Congress established this standard for nursing homes. The following year, Congress extended this requirement for hospitals. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-35, § 2173, 95 Stat. 357, 808-09 (1981).
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review unless the enabling legislation explicitly precludes
review. 110
1. De Novo Review in State Court
Under current law, assuming there is no state or federal
administrative review or mandatory ADR, consumers can bring
state causes of action arising in contract, tort, or other areas of
state law in state court. State constitutions, as well as statutory
and common law, govern the degree to which state legislatures
can foreclose such state claims. State courts also have authority
to hear federal claims unless explicitly barred by federal statute. Furthermore, Congress, under the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, can require state courts to adjudicate
federal claims and has indeed done so in some instances."'
2.

De Novo Review in Federal Court
SUITS AGAINST GOVERNMENTS AND OFFICIALS AND OTHER

Ostensibly, the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits suits in federal court against state governments by the
state's own citizens or citizens of other states. The Supreme
Court has developed several theories that permit review of actions by state governments and their personnel in federal
court." 2 The Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officers for declaratory
and injunctive relief that seek to compel state officials to implement federal policies prospectively 13 or from implementing
INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW.

110. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
111. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-72 (1990) (holding that while the
state court may not refuse to hear a federal claim, it may apply its own procedural rules to
the claim); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO Act claims); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (stating
that civil rights victims seeking redress in state courts must comply with federal requirements); Wallace v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1990) (showing that a federal civil
rights claim may be heard in a state court).
112.

E. CHEMERINSKY. FEDERAL JURISDICTION

§

7.4-.6 (1989).

113. See, e.g., Wilder, 496 U.S. at 516-17; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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state policies.'1 4 Clearly, actions
for damages against states and
1 5
state officials are barred.

A state may waive its Eleventh Amendment protection although the Supreme Court has ruled that the fact that a state
participates in a federally-funded program does not constitute
such waiver." 6 Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity but must make its intent to do so "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.""17 In 1975, Congress

briefly required states to amend their Medicaid state plans to
permit suits by hospitals for damages in federal court but repealed the requirement the next year out of concern over fiscal
constraints." 8
More importantly, section 1983"1 creates a private cause
of action against any person who, under color of state law,
abridges rights created by the Constitution and laws of the
United States. As pointed out above, the Supreme Court, in
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,'20 ruled that the Boren Amendment' created a federal cause of action under section 1983 to challenge state compliance with federal statutory
criteria for provider payment. The Court focused on whether

114. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 125 (1908) (holding that a suit brought by a
stockholder against a corporation to enjoin the directors and officers from complying with
the provisions of a state statute alleged to be unconstitutional was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment). See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 112, at § 7.6.
115. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (holding that the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states in a class action
suit for failure of the Illinois Department of Public Aid to process applications for assistance under the aid to the aged, blind, and disabled program on a timely basis); Edelman,
415 U.S. at 663 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the retroactive payment of
benefits found to have been wrongfully withheld in a class action suit against Illinois officials who were administering the federal-state programs of aid to the aged, blind, and
disabled, and who were charged with violating federal law and denying equal protection of
the laws by following state regulations that did not comply with federal time limits for
aged, blind, and disabled applications).
116. Florida Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450
U.S. 147 (1981) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal court from
ordering the state to reimburse nursing homes for the amounts they would have received if
federal regulations had been promulgated in a timely manner); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673.
117. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 101
(1989) (holding that Congress did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of
states by enacting a bankruptcy statute).
118. Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-182, § 11, 89 Stat. 1051, repealed by,
Act of Oct. 18, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-552, § 2, 90 Stat. 2540 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396) (1988 & Supp IV 1992). See S. REp. No. 1240, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
119. Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
120. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 524.
121. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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the provision in question was intended to benefit the plaintiff
and, if so, whether the statute "reflects merely a 'congressional
preference' for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding
obligation on the governmental unit," as well as whether the
plaintiff's interest was "too vague and amorphous," and thus
1 22
"beyond the judiciary's competence to enforce. 1
However, later in Suter v. Artist M.,1 18 the Supreme
Court ruled that the children beneficiaries under a federal
grant-in-aid program did not have a federal cause of action
under section 1983 to enforce statutory obligations of state officials under the federal statute. The Court did not apply the test
enunciated in Wilder, but rather focused on the statutory language to determine whether Congress had "unambiguously
confer[red] upon the child beneficiaries of the Act a right to
enforce the requirement that the State make 'reasonable
efforts.' 1124
Subsequent appellate court decisions have sought to reconcile Suter and Wilder.1 25 After Suter, appellate courts have focused carefully on the specific statutory provision in question to
determine whether the statute merely reflects a congressional
preference or binding obligation. If the statute does not clearly
compel the state to take some action regarding plaintiffs, as
opposed to a generalized obligation to submit a plan or plan
amendment, courts are unlikely to find that the statute creates
an enforceable right under section 1983.
SUITS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL

Under the principle of sovereign immunity, the
United States government may not be sued unless federal legislation specifically authorizes suit. Three major statutes waive
the federal government's sovereign immunity: (1) the federal
OFFICIALS.

122.

Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509.

123.

112 S. Ct. 1360, 1370 (1992).

124.

Id. at 1367.

125. See, e.g., Procopia v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating
that it was "prudent and possible to synthesize the teachings of Suter and the court's prior
precedents"); Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that Wilder simply
held that health care providers could sue to enforce their right to a state plan that does not
violate the Boren Amendment, whereas Surer requires only that the state adopt a plan that
provides "for a system of hearings" to determine whether payments to providers are reasonable and adequate); Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1992) (denying a federal
cause of action to enforce state compliance because the statute did not impose a direct
obligation on the state).
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APA which allows suits for injunctive relief; 12 6 (2) the Federal
Tort Claims Act which allows suits for negligence by federal
employees;1 2 7 and (3) the Tucker Act which allows suits for
breach of contract and other monetary claims not arising in
28
tort.
No federal statute comparable to section 1983 provides a
cause of action for relief against federal officers who violate the
U.S. Constitution. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has ruled
that federal officers may be sued for injunctive relief to prevent
future infringements of federal law. 29 Further, in Bivens v. Six
30
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,1
the Supreme Court inferred a cause of action for damages directly from constitutional provisions.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES IN PROPOSED
HEALTH REFORM LEGISLATION
The chief concern of administrative law is enabling private
parties affected by decisions and policies of government agencies to influence or, when necessary, challenge those decisions
or policies. Further, administrative law is concerned with the
procedures by which government discharges its responsibilities
and relates to affected private parties. The major procedural
issues are: (1) making rules and policy; (2) adjudicating disputes; and, (3) providing judicial review to enforce governmental compliance with constitutional, common law, and statutory
requirements.
The core value in designing ideal administrative procedures for a reformed health care system is the degree to which
private parties can challenge policies, decisions or other agency
actions that affect them without compromising the integrity of
the health reform system or its expeditious implementation.
Administrative procedures in any health reform proposal
should be measured against this core value.

126.
127.
128.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2678, 2680 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Id. §§ 1346(a), 1491. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 112, at § 9.2.

129.

See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. 337 U.S. 682, 689-90

(1949); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 112, at § 9.1.

130. 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
Amendment).

(inferring a cause of action under the Fourth
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The resolution of procedural issues for health reform is informed by three crucial "structural" issues raised by the overall design of a given health reform. The key structural issues
are: (1) the allocation of responsibilities between the federal
government and the states; (2) the design and powers of the
various organizations and agencies with responsibilities for
health reform; and (3) the way in which reforms relate to existing public health insurance programs including the Medicare
and Medicaid program. Clearly, the allocation of power to implement and operate health reform between the federal government and states, as well as the organizational characteristics of
responsible agencies, will influence the appropriate administrative procedures for making rules and policies, adjudicating disputes, and enforcing governmental compliance with health reform legislation and constitutional requirements through
judicial review.
A. Structural Issues
Most of the comprehensive health reform proposals before
the 103d Congress would have dramatically altered the struc-'
tural characteristics of the American health care system. Managed competition proposals would have created new organizations and agencies and vested additional powers in the federal
government and the states to oversee reforms in the health insurance market and execute other programmatic responsibilities. Proposals with incentive approaches would have endeavored to achieve comparable health system efficiencies and
enhanced access through voluntary action encouraged by tax
code and other changes. The single-payer proposals would have
eliminated private health insurance altogether, and substituted
a federal program with, in some cases, options for states to offer their own program within.federal guidelines. These structural issues are important from an administrative law perspective for they delineate the authority of responsible agencies,
and consequently influence the procedures that these agencies
will use to make rules and policy, adjudicate disputes, and enforce program requirements.
1. Allocation of State and Federal Responsibilities
Many proposals before the 103d Congress, regardless of
approach, would have accorded states the opportunity to as-
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sume considerable responsibility for the implementation of
health reform.131 Interestingly, proposals from Democrats including President Clinton tended to provide for a more distinct
state role in health reform than those from Republicans. Indeed, the President's proposal actually permitted states to establish independent single-payer systems."3 2 The strong state
focus reflects recognition of the innovative leadership that
many states have exhibited in health reform during the
1980s. 33 The major role for states in health reform also poses
important federalism issues.
Further, most proposals before the 103d Congress, regardless of the role for states, would have established oversight responsibilities for HHS for the Medicare and Medicaid programs and other public health functions and the DOL for
health plans regulated under ERISA. Further, many proposals
from across the political spectrum called for independent federal agencies to make national policy affecting the reformed
health care system. 34
The most important federalism issue from a procedural
perspective is whether a health reform proposal that requires
states to conduct various functions meets the requirements of
the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as delineated
in the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. United
States. 3 5 New York v. United States held that the Tenth
Amendment prohibits Congress from requiring states to comply
with orders falling outside Congress' enumerated powers. However, in light of New York v. United States, federal legislation
can give states the option of not participating in the reformed
system and making health reform completely a federal respon-

131. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 1200-1224; Consumer Choice Health
Security Act of 1993 § 131.
132.

Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 1200-1224.

See Deborah L. Rogel & W. David Helms, State Models: An Overview,
Summer 1993, at 27 (tracking several states in their efforts to implement
health reform legislation).
134. See note 144 infra and accompanying text.
133.

HEALTH AFF.,

135.

112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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sibility. 13 Many health reform proposals before the 103d Congress provided states with such an option.'3
A crucial issue in locating authority is whether the state or
the federal government has ultimate financial liability for the
health care services, as well as increases in expenditures for
services. Specifically, if states are liable for increases in health
care expenditures or health insurance premiums, they should
be accorded the requisite authority to regulate the institutions,
such as providers and insurers, in the health care system that
generate excess expenditures or premiums. Clearly, the degree
to which the federal government or states have ultimate financial responsibility for the provision of health care services to
subsidized groups, such as the poor and near poor, as well as
the employees of marginal small businesses, the greater degree
of interest the states and the federal government, respectively,
will have in the formulation of policy and the adjudication of
disputes. Further, states will be especially concerned about unfunded federal mandates that they will be responsible to implement and finance. 38
2. Organizational Arrangements
In addition to responsibilities accorded to HHS and DOL,
most health reform proposals before the 103d Congress called
for the creation of new government agencies and quasi-public
organizations to implement and operate aspects of the health
reform legislation. 39 Many of these agencies and organizations
were unique in their structure, whereas some had fairly strong
regulatory responsibilities that were controversial given their
unique organizational characteristics. 40
Several health reform proposals called for creation of
quasi-public organizations, to consolidate insurance purchasing
power and, to varying degrees, to perform other regulatory
136. See Candice Hoke, ConstitutionalImpediments to National Health Reform:
Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489, 550-73

(1994).
137. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993 § 1521-1524; Health Equity and Access
Reform Today Act of 1993 §§ 1441-1444; Mitchell Compromise Bill §§ 1421-1424.
138. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and The
Tenth Amendment; Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1355 (1993).
139. See infra notes 141 & 144 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
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functions for the private health insurance market. 141 One of the
most controversial aspects of the managed competition proposals before the 103d Congress was the design and authority of
agencies with responsibilities for regulating the private health
insurance market. For example, health alliances under the
President's proposal, in addition to consolidating purchasing
power in the private health insurance market, also administered
budgetary limits on health expenditures. 42 Under the Chafee
and Cooper bills, individual and employer participation was
voluntary and these organizations had minimal regulatory responsibilities.' 43 However, to the extent that participation in
these entities is voluntary, these entities would be less able to
accomplish genuine reform of the private health insurance
market.
Many proposals before the 103d Congress called for the
creation of independent federal agencies to set uniform standards and perform other oversight functions for the reformed
system. 44 These federal agencies under most proposals would
have had similar responsibilities, including establishing the
standard benefit package, national data standards, clinical
practice guidelines, and national coverage policy. 145 These re141. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 1321-1397 (health alliances); Managed Competition Act of 1993 §§ 1101-1108 (health plan purchasing cooperatives);
Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993 §§ 1141-1145 (health insurance
purchasing cooperations).
142. Health Security Act of 1993 § 1300.
143. See, e.g., Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993 §§ 1141-1145;
Managed Competition Act of 1993 §§ 1101-1108.
144. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 1201-1217 (National Health Benefits
Board), §§ 1501-1506 (National Health Board); Health Equity and Access Reform Today
Act of 1993 § 1311-1315 (Benefits Commission); Managed Competition Act of 1993
§§ 1301-1313 (Health Care Standards Commission). See also Affordable Health Care
Now Act § 1108 (Office of Private Health Care Coverage within HHS).
145. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 401, 1503; Health Equity and Access
Reform Today Act of 1993 § 1312; Managed Competition Act of 1993 §§ 1301-1312.
These federal oversight agencies essentially would assume functions that HHS currently performs regarding Medicare coverage policy, medical practice guidelines, and other
policy issues. Currently, HCFA makes coverage decisions based on referrals from Medicare contractors. HCFA may refer an issue to the Public Health Service (which makes
recommendations) upon consultation with the Food and Drug Administration (which approves certain medical devices and the National Institutes of Health. The Public Health
Service then makes recommendations on whether federal health insurance programs should
pay for specific health care technologies. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2992-2(d)(3), 242(c)(e) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992). The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) has direct
responsibility for sponsoring the development of clinical practice guidelines, as well as enhancing the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of health care services through research and the promotion of improvements in clinical practice. Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
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sponsibilities involve very different types of issues and should
be executed through processes that elicit the best information
for decision making from a scientific and equity perspective.
Under the President's proposal, a National Health Board also
would have implemented the national budget for health care
spending through the alliances - a controversial function that
distinguished the President's proposal from other managed
competition proposals. 46
Some health reform proposals even call for private organizations to assist in the policy-making function. For example,
several proposals would have the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) or the private accrediting organizations such as the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) to suggest policy and
standards for various state responsibilities under health reform.14 7 The structure of many of the organizations called for
under various health reform proposals, especially when coupled
with unique regulatory authority, may implicate the delegation
doctrine in constitutional law.' 48 This problem was potentially
greatest with the alliances under the President's proposal as
these alliances had extraordinary responsibilities that customarily reside in government agencies, such as implementation of
the national budget on health care spending.
The Administrative Conference of the United States has
recommended that private regulation be used when both the
responsible agency and the private organization have the organizational ability in terms of expertise, experience, and author-

ation Act of 1989, § 6103, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2101, 2104 (codified at 42

U.S.C. § 299).
146.

Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 1501-1506.

147. Id. § 4307(d). See, e.g., Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993
§ 1102; Consumer Choice Health Security Act § 118; Affordable Health Care Now Act
of 1993 §§ l102(a)(1)(F), 1103(a)(1), 1106(a)(1) (1993).

148. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (holding that Congress
may delegate power to a coordinate branch, so long as it sets forth standards to which the
agency must conform); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989) (holding that a delegation of Congress' taxation power to the Department of Transportation was
permissible); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that Congress did
not delegate excessive legislative powers in creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission). See
also Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1982) (discussing the modern delegation doctrine).
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ity to implement the regulatory assignment effectively. 149 Also,
the private organization should have fair and democratic procedures for the development of regulatory standards and the responsible agency has access to applicable records of the private
organization. 50
In general, however, the delegation doctrine is quite permissive and has sanctioned the delegation of many public functions, such as the establishment of criteria and standards for
government regulatory programs 5 ' to private organizations.
The rationale for such delegation is that private bodies have
unique expertise or capabilities that do not reside in government. 5' The problem with delegation comes when Congress
delegates quasi-public organizations more proactive responsibil4
ities without sufficient statutory standards or direction.'
3. Relations of Health Reform with Existing Programs
A major issue for all health reform proposals is what to do
with government health insurance programs, such as the health
insurance programs for military dependents and veterans, as
well as the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Medicare and
Medicaid are especially crucial since they cover nearly fiftyeight million Americans including the elderly, the severely disabled and some poor. 155 Both programs present real but different challenges for health reformers. Medicare is a popular program serving the elderly and severely disabled, and these

149. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, The
Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, Recommendation No. 94-1, 59
Fed. Reg. 44,701, 44,701 (1994).

150. Id.
151. See DOUGLAS C. MICHAEL, FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF AUDITED SELF-REGULATION AS A REGULATORY TECHNIQUE (1993); Eleanor D. Kinney, Government as a Substi-

tute for Direct Regulation in Private Accreditation of Public Health Insurance Programs,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoEs. 47 (1994) [hereinafter Private Accreditation].
152. See, e.g., Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private
Regulators and their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1989); Harold J.
Krent, Fragmentingthe Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62 (1990).
153. See Kinney, Private Accreditation, supra note 151.

154. See, e.g., United States v. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the National Industry Recovery Act because it impermissibly delegated legislative
functions to the President); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 392 (1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act as an improper delegation of legislative
authority to the President).
155. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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constituencies have successfully pressed policy makers to retain
the independence of the Medicare program in any new system.
And, at least two health reform proposals before the 103d Congress called for expanding Medicare to all Americans in a single-payer system. 156
Medicaid is a horse of a different color. Medicaid is the
only public health insurance program that taps state revenues
for its financing, but also serves an expansive population compared to other societal groups.157 Historically, Medicaid, which
is jointly administered by the federal government and states,
has been a controversial program because of the pressures of
escalating program expenditures on the budgets of the federal
and particularly state governments. Consequently, state health
reformers resisted incorporating the expensive Medicaid population into reformed systems in ways that would increase state
1 58
financial liability.
Under most managed competition proposals before the
103d Congress, including the President's, the Medicare program would have remained intact but with streamlined billing
and claims administration procedures. 5 9 Most managed competition proposals would have incorporated the Medicaid program into the private health insurance system over a period of
years. 60 Under the single-payer proposals, Medicare and
Medicaid would be incorporated into the single-payer system.' As no health reform completely eliminated the Medi-

156.

The American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 1200, S. 491, 103d Cong.,

1st Sess. (1993)[hereinafter The American Health Security Act of 1993].
157. Deborah Chollet, Employer-Based Health Insurance In A Changing Work
Force, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 315 (discussing the employees and their families
working in various industries who are insured under the Medicaid program).
158. Adam Clymer, The Nation: In the Arithmetic of Health Care, It Pays to Aim
for 100%, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1994, § 4, at 16; Robert Pear, The Health Care Debate:
The States; A Promise on Coverage; A Hint on Abortion, N.Y. TIMEs, July 18, 1994, at
A 12; Robert Pear, The Health Care Debate: The States; Governors Oppose Key Dole Proposal on a Health Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1994, § 1, at 1.

159.

Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 4101-4141; Affordable Health Care Now Act

of 1993 §§ 2401-2411; Managed Competition Act of 1993 §§ 2201-2208; Consumer

Choice Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 201-206; Health Equity and Access Reform Today
Act of 1993 §§ 6111-6139.

160. Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 4201-4251; Health Equity and Access Reform
Today Act of 1993 § 6031; Comprehensive Family Health Access and Savings Act

§§

901-902 [hereinafter Comprehensive Family Health Access and Savings Act].

161.

See, e.g., The American Health Care Act of 1993 § 106.
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care and Medicaid programs, all proposals raised questions
about the coordination of health reform with these programs.
B.

Rule and Policy Making

All health reform proposals before the 103d Congress
would have required responsible government agencies and private organizations to make a wide variety of rules and policies
to implement the health reform legislation.16 Most health reform proposals required rulemaking to implement the major
programmatic functions of the health reform legislation including defining benefits and coverage, defining eligibility and enrollment in health plans, regulating health plans and their participating providers, assuring the quality of health care
services, evaluating plan and provider performance, regulating
the private health insurance market, paying health plans and
providers, financing health benefits, controlling fraud and
abuse, collecting and managing data, and enforcing cost controls, if any.
The procedures by which rules are made as well as the
sponsorship of rules are crucial determinants of their legal effect. If the sponsor is a government agency, it must use rule
and policy-making procedures delineated in the agency's enabling act or the applicable administrative procedure act to promulgate rules having legal effect.'6 3 If the sponsor is a private
organization, it must use corporate policy-making
procedures
64
or contracts to make legally binding policy.'
Other than to specify subject matters on which agencies
should promulgate rules and standards, health reform proposals
before the 103d Congress were not very specific about procedures to be invoked in making rules and policies for health reform. Several proposals called for the use of interim final rules
to permit expeditious implementation of health reform legislation.' 5 In specific instances, several bills called for the reliance
162.

Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making Under Health Reform, in ADMIN-

ISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM (1994) (not paginated).
163. CHARLES H. KOCH. JR.. I ADMIN. LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.52,

at 171-72

(1985).

164. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 133 (3d ed. 1993).
165.

See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1994 § 1102(b); Health Security Act of 1993

§ 1911; Dole Compromise Bill § 201.
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on standards established by private organizations
such as the
16 7
NAIC l66 or private accreditation bodies.
Any health reform proposal, particularly if it imposes responsibilities on states, will encounter three major challenges in
rule and policy making. First, responsible agencies will have to
implement rules and policies quickly to get the health reform
up and running. Second, responsible agencies will have to make
rules and policies on subjects that are highly controversial and
require medical and technical expertise in an environment
where cost constraints are paramount. Third, state rule and
policy-making responsibilities may be too burdensome for the
rulemaking procedures of some states. These challenges are
discussed in greater detail below.
1. Promulgating Rules and Policy Expeditiously
The task of crafting and properly promulgating all the
requisite rules and policy to implement health reform legislation is great. It is especially challenging to do so and still get
the appropriate public input necessary to achieve sound policy
and avoid subsequent judicial challenges from affected individuals and interest groups. However, there are some strategies
that might achieve these two important goals.
Specifically, responsible agencies should carefully consider
whether rules need to be legislative and thus made pursuant to
more time-consuming statutory rulemaking procedures. Certainly, agencies should steer clear of formal, trial-type procedures, if possible, and use them only if it is necessary to adjudicate complex, technical facts.' 68 Further, interpretative rules or
program guidance, which need not be promulgated according
to statutory procedures, may be sufficient to inform the public
of their responsibilities under the legislation. One intractable
problem with interpretative rules, however, is their susceptibility to procedural challenges on grounds that they are invalid as
they are actually legislative rules.' 69

166.
167.

See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1994 § 1501(b)(4), Dole Compromise Bill

§ 201(a).
168. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, Recommendation No. 72-5
(1972).
169. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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One approach is the use of interim final rulemaking authority under the good cause exception of the federal APA and
comparable provisions of state APAs. 170 Several proposals
before the 103d Congress called for widespread use of interim
final rules for agencies in establishing the reformed health system. 17 ' This practice, although unpopular with consumers and
providers, has been upheld by courts.17 For example, in Coalition of Michigan Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey, 17- HHS
had invoked the "good cause" exception in a regulation pertaining to Medicaid state plan amendments on grounds that to
proceed with a thirty day notice and comment period was impractical given the legislatively imposed time limits. The court
stated that meeting such deadlines was a clear example of impracticability and satisfied the requirement for good cause.1 74
Another excellent strategy for expeditious rulemaking is to
borrow heavily from applicable standards that private organizations such as the NAIC or the JCAHO have developed, particularly if the standards have been made in a democratic procedure that assures the input of respected experts and opinion
leaders.17 5 Use of such private standards is also an effective
way to enhance public confidence in the rules and policy as well
as public support for the health reform legislation. As discussed
above, the Administrative Conference of the United States has
recommended use of private standards when they have been developed in an open and democratic process. 178
Congress also can establish a special statutory rulemaking
procedure in the enabling statute that is more expeditious than
notice and comment rulemaking procedures under the APA to
make legislative rules in specific areas. Or Congress can insulate certain interpretative rules from procedural challenges. For

170.
171.

See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.

172. See, e.g., Philadelphia Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877 (3rd Cir.
1982) (calling for the dispensing of the HHS's notice and comment procedure in promulgating rules); Universal Health Services of McAllen v. Sullivan, 770 F. Supp. 704 (D.C.

Cir. 1991) (holding that interim final rules can become effective immediately without notice and comment if made with good cause); Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1200-03 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (upholding interim final rule mandating reductions in administrative reimbursement to Child Care Food Program within 60 days after enactment of enabling legislation).
173. 537 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
174. Id.
175. See sources cited supra note 151.
176. See notes 149-50 supra and accompanying text.
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example, Congress recognized that the special policy-making
process for making national coverage policy under the Medicare program is designed to tap medical expertise and exempted that process from procedural challenges for failure to
follow legislative rulemaking procedures under the federal
APA. 1 7 Congress concluded that the procedures for making
national coverage determinations specifically solicited medical
input and the need to preserve the scientific integrity of national coverage policy made APA procedures unnecessary. 178
However, the Administrative Conference of the United States
opposed this approach in its recommendation on Medicare national coverage policy.' 79
Regarding limiting judicial challenge, Congress may want
to consider limiting or even precluding judicial review of certain rules and policies although such limitations and preclusions should be used sparingly. For example, statutory pre-enforcement review can "smoke out" judicial challenges to
promulgated rules and settle their validity. 80 Some statutes,
particularly in the environmental area,' 8 ' actually preclude judicial review of a rule in an enforcement proceeding because
pre-enforcement review is available.' 82 Negotiated rulemaking
in which all parties with substantial interests at stake participate in negotiating the content of the rule are expressly
designed to reduce subsequent judicial challenge.' 83

177. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
178. H.R. REP. No. 1012, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 350-51 (1986).
179. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, National Coverage Determinations Under the Medicare Program, Recommendation No. 87-8,
52 Fed. Reg. 49,141, 49,144 (1987). See Kinney, National Coverage Policy Under the
Medicare Program:Problems and Proposalsfor Change, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 869 (1988).

180. See GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 31, at 310-17.
181. See id. at 313 n.126.
182. See Paul Verkuil, CongressionalLimitations on Judicial Review of Rules, 57
TULANE L. REV. 733 (1983). See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, Judicial Review of Rules in Enforcement Proceedings, Recommendation
No. 82-7, 47 Fed. Reg. 58,207, 58,208 (1982).
183. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969
(1990), 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-90 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, Recommendation No. 85-5, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,894 (1985), Recommendation
No. 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701, 30,708 (1982). See also ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1990) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
US SOURCEBOOK]; Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise?, 71
GEO. L.J. 1 (1982); Henry Perritt, Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The
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In some limited cases, it may be well to limit the subject
matter and scope of judicial review. For example, Congress has
precluded judicial review of certain elements of the payment
methodologies that Medicare uses to pay hospitals and physicians because of the need to maintain the rate setting systems
for these providers.184 However, Congress has also established
elaborate procedures for the establishment of these rates with a
dialogue between specially created expert congressional commissions and HHS that permits considerable public input at
the inception of the rate setting process."8 5
Finally, it also will be important to get rules and policy
right the first time. The Supreme Court has emphatically limited the use of retroactive rules in the Medicare program. 86 To
meet this challenge, Congress and state agencies need to give
thought to the type of public input and advice they need to
develop good rules and policy, and then design rulemaking procedures that accomplish these objectives. Responsible agencies
should make every effort to identify the type of input such as
medical expertise needed for making sound policy in designing
a rulemaking process that will obtain the requisite technical input and accommodate legitimate interests. With these efforts,
the agency can reduce subsequent judicial challenges that will
delay implementation of the health reform legislation.
2.

Controversial Subject Areas

There are two subject areas that will require rules under
any health reform proposal and that promise to be especially
controversial. The first issue is the delineation of benefits and
their coverage. The second is the definition of the quality of
health care services and the measures and methods by which
quality will be determined. The proper delineation of policy in
both fields is highly dependent on medical expertise and goes to
the core of public and professional concern about the health
Development of Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 PEPP. L. REv. 863

(1987).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(7) (hospitals); § 1395w-4(i)(1) (physicians) (1988).
185. See Kinney, Making Hard Choices, supra note 93.
186.

Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (holding that a rule

retroactively establishing the Medicare wage schedules was invalid); Health Ins. Ass'n of
Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that interpretative rules may
not be retroactive).
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care system - the availability of all necessary health care services of high quality.
Coverage, which defines the amount, duration, and scope
of benefits, as well as the medical necessity or appropriateness
of services, raises difficult questions about the availability of
high technology care for catastrophic illness, the continued
search for more and better cures for serious illness, and even
access to unorthodox medical services. Not surprisingly, coverage policy has been controversial for private health insurers
and HMOs,"' as well as for the Medicare and Medicaid programs.18 In addition to objecting to the content of Medicare
coverage policy, the medical profession and medical device
manufacturers have objected to the closed procedures by which
HCFA makes Medicare coverage policy.' 8 9
One of the greatest challenges for any government sponsored health reform initiative is selecting and/or promulgating
the standards, criteria, and methods to be used in measuring
and monitoring the quality of care provided in a reformed
health care system.190 Clearly, any standards, criteria, and
methods must reflect a broad consensus, both within the medical profession and among consumers, as to what constitutes
good quality health care. Also, the level of detail involved in
this task is staggering as is the degree of technical medical expertise required to create sound policy in the quality assurance
field. Further, the challenge of rule and policy making in the
quality assurance and improvement area will be especially
great because of the increased interest and concern of consum-

187. Frank P. James, The Experimental Treatment Exclusion Clause: A Tool for
Silent Rationing of Health Care?, 12 J.LEGAL MED. 359 (1991) (discussing the controversy of surrounding the exclusion of experimental treatment from coverage); David
Mechanic, Professional Judgment and the Rationing of Medical Care, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1713 (1992) (discussing the inevitability of more stringent health care rationing); Julia F.
Costich, Note, Denial of Coverage for "Experimental" Medical Procedures: The Problem
of De Novo Review under ERISA, 79 Ky. L.J. 801 (1990-91) (discussing the de novo
standard of review for the denial of health benefits under ERISA and the use of the adversary system as a forum of decision making).
188. See Eleanor D. Kinney, National Coverage Policy Under the Medicare Program, supra note 179; see also Recommendation No. 87-8, supra note 179.

189. Kinney, National Coverage Policy Under the Medicare Program, supra note
179, at 904-14.
190.

See Timothy S. Jost, Health System Reform: Forward or Backward with Qual-

ityOversight, 271 JAMA 1508 (1994) (pointing out problems with the regulation of quality under health reform).
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ers in determining quality.'91 Clearly, the enforcement of qualthe Medicare program has been a controversial
ity measures in
92
undertaking.1
The current theories of coverage and quality assurance are
informed by health services research on the effectiveness or
"outcomes" of specific medical procedures. 93 In recent years,
third party payers have used outcomes research on costly and
widely used medical procedures to define the content of medically necessary and appropriate care through development of
medical practice guidelines, clinical standards, and quality assurance measures.' 94 The theory behind using outcomes research in this way is that cost savings can be achieved and

191. See Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons
from Medical Consumerism and the Patients' Rights, Women's Health and Disability
Rights Movements, 20 AM. J. LAW & MED. 147 (1994) (emphasizing the role of consumers in defining quality health care).
192. See Alice G. Gosfield, Value Purchasingin Medicare Law: Precursorto Health
Reform, 20 AM. J. LAW & MED. 169 (1994) (analyzing the Medicare experience in the
quality assurance field); Timothy S. Jost, Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organizations (PRO) Program:Analysis
and Recommendations, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1989). See also Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Peer Review and Sanctions in the Medicare
Program, Recommendation No. 89-1, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,964, 28,965 (1989).
193. See Robert H. Brook & Kathleen M. Lohr, Efficacy, Effectiveness, Variations,
and Quality: Boundary Crossing Research, 23 Med. Care 710, 713-14 (1985) (describing
differences in medical services research outcomes); Mark Chassin, Standards of Care in
Medicine, 25 INQUIRY 436, 437-38 (1988); David M. Eddy, Variationsin Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 74, 80-82 (discussing the
difficulties posed by uncertainty in outcomes research); John E. Wennberg, Commentary:
On Patient Need, Equity, Supplier-Induced Demand, and the Need to Assess the Outcomes of Common Medical Procedures,23 MED. CARE 512, 520 (1985) (describing outcomes research by the National Center for Health Services (NCHS) and Health Care
Technology Assessment (HCTA)); John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice
Variations: A Proposalfor Action, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6, 20-21 (discussing
proposals for the improvement of outcomes research).
194. Mark Chassin, supra note 193, at 437-38; Eleanor D. Kinney, Report of the
Medical Guidelines Panel, in RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE. HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND TORT SYSTEMS ON

A

COLLISION COURSE

46, 53-54 (1992) (outlining the histori-

cal development of medical practice guidelines and their implications in the medical liability system).
In 1989, Congress charged the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research to support outcomes research on outcomes of specific medical procedures and to sponsor development of medical practice guidelines based on this research. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6103, 103 Stat. 2189 (1989) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 299). HCFA has engaged in a similar initiative before establishment of
AHCPR. See William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care:An Initiative to Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1197 (1988) (describing the
federal effort in this regard).
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quality improved by limiting coverage of such health care services that do not have a significant impact.19 5
Under most health reform proposals, an independent federal agency has broad authority to establish policy that defines
and updates the national benefit package and its coverage policy. 119 Further, most proposals have a general standard that
medical care must meet to be a covered benefit, such as "medically necessary" or "medically appropriate."' 97 Prevailing definitions of coverage, such as "medically necessary," "experimental," and "investigational," have been interpreted
extensively by both state and federal courts, and thus have specific legal meanings that may persist under the new system.' 98
Most health reform proposals before the 103d Congress
also gave federal and state agencies important responsibilities
to monitor the quality of health care that health plans and
providers accorded consumers under the reformed health care
system.' 99 Some proposals even called for the creation of special agencies with quality assurance responsibilities. For example, under Senator Mitchell's compromise bill, the Secretary of
HHS had responsibility for a performance-based system of
quality management and improvement that included establishing a National Quality Council, with explicit rulemaking authority, to oversee a program of quality management and im195. See, e.g., David M. Eddy & John Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence:
Implicationsfor Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF, Spring 1988, at 19, 29-31 (arguing in
support for improvement of evidence and procedures used in outcomes research); John E.
Wennberg, Improving the Medical Decision-Making Process, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988,
at 99, 104-05 (discussing how the NCHS and HCTA are conducting outcomes research
that will provide for a higher quality and medical care and create more certainty in medical practices and guidelines). See also Arnold M. Epstein, The Outcomes Movement Will It Get Us Where We Want to Go?, 323 NEw ENG. J.MED. 266 (1990) (discussing the
viability of using outcomes research to develop standards of medical treatment).
196. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993 § 1411; Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993 § 1301(b); Managed Competition Act of 1993 § 1302(b); Consumer Choice Health Security Act of 1993 § 112; Affordable Health Care Now Act
§ 1102; Dole Compromise Bill § 201(a); Mitchell Compromise Bill § 1213.
198. See LINDA A. BERGTHOLD & WILLIAM M. SAGE, MEDICAL NECESSITY. EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT AND COVERAGE DECISIONS: LESSONS FROM NATIONAL HEALTH RE-

FORM. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT ISSUES PAPER (Oct. 1994);

Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurer's Assessment of Medical Necessity,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992); Kinney, National Coverage Policy Under the Medicare
Program, supra note 179.
199. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 5001-5123; Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993 §§ 3001-3315; Managed Competition Act of 1993

§§ 501-504.
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provement 00 Senator Dole's compromise bill called for the
establishment of the Agency for Quality Assurance and Consumer Information within HHS to supervise a quality assurance program. 20 1 Included among its duties was development of
minimum guidelines for health care quality measures. 2
Under health reform, several proposals call for the responsible federal agency to conduct outcomes research and develop
medical practice guidelines and coverage policy based on that
research.2 0 3 The medical profession, health care institutions,
drug device manufacturers, and patients will be vitally interested in the content of medical practice guidelines that will ultimately dictate coverage policy under the reformed system.204
While notice and comment rulemaking procedures under the
APA may not be necessary or even desirable to use in developing medical practice guidelines and similar policy, some
thought should be accorded to designing a process for developing policy in this area in an expeditious fashion that accommodates legitimate interests. Reviewing the experience of the
Medicare program in this area also would be instructive. 20 5
3. Adequacy of State Rulemaking Procedures
Most health reform proposals accord states various responsibilities for implementation. 0 In so doing, the proposals are
relying on state rulemaking procedures and other state policy
making procedures - existing or invented - to provide consumer and provider input.207 Are these procedures adequate,
particularly in view of the need to promulgate a large volume
of rules and policies in a short period of time?
Rulemaking under the Medicaid program became especially controversial in the 1980s when Congress legislated dra200. Mitchell Compromise Bill §§ 1401, 5001.
201. Dole Compromise Bill § 211.
202. Id. § 211(b)(3).
203. Health Security Act of 1993 § 5312; Managed Competition Act of 1993
§ 5301; Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993 §§ 3003-3005; Health Reform Consensus Act of 1994 § 3109.
204. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION. A PARTNERSHIP FOR HEALTH CARE
REFORM: NEGOTIATIONS AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM (Feb. 1993) (proposing negotiated

rulemaking for Medicare coverage policy).

205. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
206.

See supra note 131 and accompanying text.

207. See STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, supra note 29, at § 64.2 (discussing the public's right to participate in the proposed rules).
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matic changes in the Medicaid program that were opposed by
the Republican administrations and HHS dallied in promulgating the requisite regulations to implement the legislative
changes.2 8 Congress often mandated that states implement
legislative changes whether or not the federal government
promulgated

regulations. 20 9

This

practice

caused

great

problems for states and generated a recommendation from the
Administrative Conference of the United States to restrict such
practices. 10
C. Adjudicating Consumer, Provider, and Payer Disputes
Invariably, disputes will arise between responsible agencies
and the individuals and organizations affected by health reform
legislation.2

11

Reviewed below are the provisions in the major

health reform proposals of the 103d Congress that addressed
adjudication of consumer and provider disputes, as well as the
major issues to be addressed in designing an administrative appeals system.
1. Consumer Disputes
Consumers will inevitably have individual disputes under
any health reform legislation that will require forums for adjudication and resolution."' Most disputes will arise in the context of claims and include coverage of services, liability for provided services that are not covered benefits,218 co-insurance
issues, and payment issues. Important consumer disputes also
208.

See Robert Pear, U.S. Laws Delayed by Complex Rules and Partisanship,

N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1991, at Al, A14 (criticizing the slowness of officials in publishing
the rules implementing changes in the Medicaid program).
209. See Federaland State Coordination:Medicaid - State Plans and Financing
in Project:Federaland State Coordination:A Survey of Administrative Law Schemes, 46
ADMIN. L. REv. 481 (1994) (detailing the extensive federal-state coordination necessitated

under the Medicaid program).
210. Recommendation No. 90-8, supra note 47. See Kinney, A Challenge to Federalism, supra note 47, at 875-82 (summarizing the vast number of changes to the Medicaid
program mandated by Congress since 1981).
211. Timothy S. Jost, Administrative Adjudication Issues in Health Reform in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE REFORM, supra note 6 (not paginated).
212. See Margaret G. Farrell, Resolving Patient Disputes under Health Reform, J.

L. & HEALTH (forthcoming 1995).
213. This issue pertains to the problem solved by the waiver of liability rules under
the Medicare program in which beneficiaries are only liable to pay for services if they had
reason to know that the services were not covered. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992).
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will arise independently of claims and will involve not only
health plans, but also providers and responsible agencies and
organizations charged with regulatory responsibilities under the
reformed system.
Regardless of approach, a government-sponsored health
reform system necessarily must have a system of "mass justice"
for adjudicating disputes the consumers have with responsible
agencies that provide and/or pay for their health care services.
Such a system would be comparable to the "mass justice" systems established under the Social Security Disability and other
federal entitlement programs. 1 As such, an adjudication system for a reformed health care system raises all the issues of
achieving due process with meaningful hearings at a minimal
cost.21 5 The development of the law of due process since Mathews v. Eldridge, 16 has stressed flexibility in the design of
hearing procedures, and has basically concluded that oral hearings are required only when the credibility and veracity of witnesses regarding disputed adjudicative facts are at issue. 17
Consequently, there is great opportunity for innovation in the
design of hearing procedures for a reformed health reform
system.
a.

The Bills

Most bills before the 103d Congress were not very specific
about systems for resolving consumer disputes, although they
included some noteworthy approaches. Specifically, the Cooper
bill would have required that health plan purchasing cooperatives establish a complaint process for consumers regarding the
performance of their duties21 8 and that health plans establish
"effective" procedures for hearing and resolving grievances be-

214. See, e.g., M. DONNA PRICE COFER, ADMINISTERING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE. A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1982); JERRY L. MASHAW. BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983); Kinney, The
Medicare Appeals System, supra note 74.
215. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
(1984); Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B U L REV
885 (1981); Lawrence Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. CR.-CL. L. REV. 269
(1975); William Van Alstyne, supra note 54.
216. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

217.

BERNARD SCHWARTZ,

218.

Managed Competition Act of 1993 §§ 1107-1108.

supra note 45, § 5.24-5.27 (1991).
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tween the plan and enrolled individuals according to procedures
of the federal oversight commission.2 19 One bill for a singlepayer system would have required that ombudsmen at the state
level register consumer complaints about the operation of the
state program and resolve complaints between consumers and
providers.220
The Chafee bill would have required that each state program develop a binding arbitration process for the adjudication
disputes over coverage and utilization of services.2 2 1 Further, a

health plan official who maintained that an item or service was
not necessary or appropriate must have so demonstrated in the
arbitration proceeding by a preponderance of available scientific evidence. 22 A health plan also must have maintained documentation to support its utilization and coverage decisions. 2
The President's bill outlined the most detailed procedures
for adjudicating disputes under health reform. 2 4 Health plans
were required to have a benefit claims dispute procedure.

25

Claims were the event that triggered the appeal and were defined as a "claim for payment or provision of benefits" or "a
request for preauthorization of items or services" submitted to
a health plan. 2 6 Further review would be before a "complaint

review office" in the regional alliance. 27 States would establish
a complaint review office for each regional alliance and would
select one of these offices to serve corporate alliances operating
inthe state2 28 Administrative review before the alliance complaint review office would be the exclusive means of review for
plans maintained by corporate alliances. 22 9 At the alliance

complaint review office level, claimants would elect whether to
proceed directly to a court of competent jurisdiction without
219. Id. § 1207. See Jost, Administrative Adjudication Issues, supra note 211, at 7.
220. Health Security Act of 1993 § 405(b)(1)(I). See Jost, Administrative Adjudication Issues, supra note 211, at 7.
221. Health Equity and Access Reform Act Today §§ 1113(d), 1407. See Jost, Administrative Adjudication Issues, supra note 211, at 7.
222. Health Equity and Access Reform Act Today § 1407. See Jost, Administrative
Adjudication Issues, supra note 211, at 7.
223. Health Equity and Access Reform Act Today § 1301 (d)(4). See Jost, Administrative Adjudication Issues, supra note 211, at 7.
224. Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 5201-5243.
225. Id. § 5201.

226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. § 5201(a)(1).
Id. §§ 5202-5204.
Id. § 5202.
Id. § 5202(d).
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further administrative review, ADR procedures, such as mediation, maintained by the complaint review office,213 or have an
oral hearing before the complaint review office. Claimants
could appeal the determination of the complaint review office to
a Federal Health Plan Review Board in DOL.23 1 Judicial review of this board's decisions would have been available for
amounts in controversy exceeding $10,000.232
Senator Mitchell's compromise bill showed some development in the appeal procedures over the President's original bill.
The provisions regarding preliminary appeals at the plan level
were much the same as the President's bill, although with important differences.2 3 One key difference was an expanded definition of "claim" to include the "denial, reduction or termination of any service or request for a referral or
reimbursement. ' 234 Another change was a shorter time period
for the health plan's first choice of a disposition of claim.2 35
The other major change was the location of the complaint review office that hears initial appeals from a health alliance to
an entity the state designated for each community-rating
23 6
area.
The Mitchell bill called for a more streamlined hearing
process than the President's bill. Specifically, the Mitchell bill
permitted the claimant to make three elections upon filing a
complaint: (1) proceed directly to a court of competent jurisdiction without further administrative process, (2) submit to alternative dispute resolution, or (3) proceed with an administrative hearing before the complaint review office.237 Regarding
the first option, the Mitchell bill did not require claimants
under ERISA-regulated health plans to proceed with ERISA
230. Id. §§ 5211-5215.
231. Id. § 5205.
232. Id. § 5205(e).
233. Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5501.
ate version) § 5201(a).
234. Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5501.

See Health Security Act of 1993 (SenSee Health Security Act of 1993 (Sen-

ate version) § 5201(a).
235.

Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5501. See Health Security Act of 1993

(Sen-

ate version) § 5201(b)(1).
236. Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5502(a). See Health Security Act of 1993 (Senate version) § 5202(a).
237. Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5503(a).
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administrative review as did the President's bill.2 38 The second
option regarding use of alternative dispute resolution was virtually the same in the bills of the President and Senator
Mitchell. 39
Regarding administrative review, the procedures for administrative review under option three of the Mitchell bill were
the same as the President's bill except that the Mitchell bill
required the hearing officer to render a decision within 120
days of the assignment of the complaint.240 The Mitchell bill
did not require additional administrative review before the Federal Health Plan Review Board, as did the President's bill.24 x
Rather, the Mitchell bill would have authorized claimants to
proceed directly to court to obtain appropriate relief including
the provision of disputed benefits.2 42 The Mitchell bill provided
that in such enforcement proceedings, the court could not review an administrative order in favor of the complainant.243
b.

Design Issues

PRELIMINARY GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE. In general, health
plans need some kind of grievance procedure to handle complaints of individual consumers over claims and other matters,
particularly if the health plan is executing public responsibilities under health reform legislation. As stated above, many
health reform proposals required such a procedure.244 The
grievance process should commence with a very informal meeting led by responsible plan personnel with authority to make
requisite decisions in order to correct mistakes or obtain medical or other information that can resolve the dispute.245 In this
meeting, the plan representative should try to resolve the dispute and would advise the consumer of future steps in the appeals process. The health plan would provide the consumer
with a written decision and notice of further appeal steps. It is

238. Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5503(a)(1). See Health Security Act of 1993
(Senate version) § 5203(a)(1).
239. Mitchell Compromise Bill §§ 5511-5515.
240. Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5504(c)(4). See Health Security Act of 1993
(Senate version) § 5204(d)(1).
241. See Health Security Act of 1993 (Senate version) § 5205.
242. Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5504(d)(2).
243. Id. § 5504(0(2).
244. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
245. See Stayn, supra note 79.
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noteworthy that the Medicare HMO appeals process, described
above, required Medicare HMOs to have grievance procedures
for final authority over such matters as disputes over choice of
physicians or specialists or conflicts with HMO employees.2 46
c.

Subsequent Appeal Procedures

A threshold question is whether health reform legislation
should specify an appeal procedure above the plan grievance
procedure at all. If the legislation is silent, consumers will be
able to pursue remedies in state and federal courts under the
law of judicial review discussed above. 47
A second threshold question is whether appeals should go
through an administrative system, a form of ADR, or a court.
Presumably an administrative adjudication system will have
more expertise to adjudicate appeals expeditiously compared to
a court. ADR endeavors to resolve disputes between parties
without recourse to courts or even administrative tribunals.2 48
As indicated above, the President's bill permitted ADR as an
option for administrative review, and the Chafee bill required
binding arbitration for consumer disputes with health plans
over coverage and utilization of services.249
However, use of ADR is not without controversy.2 50 An
important concern about ADR methods pertains to issues involving medical expertise, such as coverage denial disputes, because of the disparate and inferior position of the consumer visd.-vis the health plan and the potential for compromising the
consumer's interest unfairly, particularly if the consumer is not
represented by counsel.
Nevertheless, there is room for creativity in the design of
administrative hearing procedures under health reform. Indeed,
it may be desirable to give consumers the option of selecting
hearing formats that are the most comfortable forum from
their perspective. Suggested options include "paper" or "onthe-record" reviews, telephone hearings, or oral hearings before
246.
247.

See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
See supra part II.C.

248. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL.. DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2d Ed. 1992); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF U.S. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 183.

249. See supra notes 221-22, 230, 237 and accompanying text.
250. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986).
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a senior plan representative. In any event, hearing formats
should be as informal as possible to permit expeditious adjudication without counsel, although a consumer may be represented by counsel at any point.
THE DEFINITION OF AN APPEALABLE EVENT. A key issue
for any proposal is the definition of the event that triggers the
appeal. No other issue has generated greater concern from consumer groups in the debate over health reform.2 51 The various
health reform proposals do not address the issue adequately.
For example, under the President's proposal, procedures for adjudicating coverage and payment disputes are activated by an
appeal on a "claim. 252 As noted above, the Mitchell bill expanded the definition of claim to address this concern.253
A key question is whether the definition of "claim" is expansive enough to include decisions of HMOs and other prepaid health plans to terminate or not provide requested services. In such health plans, consumers customarily do not
submit claims for coverage and payment of specific services.
Consequently, such consumers might be unable to challenge a
provider decision to terminate or withhold services. Another
mechanism, such as an initial determination concept, could be
used to activate the appeals mechanism used2 54for prepaid health
plans, as is the case with Medicare HMOs.
A crucial problem is how to identify an appealable event
in the reality of medical practice that requires physicians to
choose among an array of treatment modalities for many medi251. See, e.g., Testimony before the Subcomm. on Healthfor Familiesand the Uninsured Comm. on Finance of the U.S. Senate, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 29, 1994)
(statement of Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr., representing Coalition for Consumer Protection and
Quality in Health Care Reform) (discussing due process rights of notice, appeal, and grievance rights as essential in any health care plan); On Access to Justice, Discriminationand
Health Care Reform: Testimony before the Health and Environment Subcomm. of the
Energy and Commerce Comm. of the U.S. House of Rep., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 31,
1994) (statement of Rand E. Rosenblatt, co-chair of Society of American Law Teachers
Comm. on Access to Justice in Health Care Reform) (arguing Clinton's health care reform
plan does not provide an adequate system by which consumers in HMOs may be notified
when a claim has been appealed); COALITION FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND QUALITY
IN HEALTH CARE REFORM. WHITE PAPER ON CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS 1-6
(1993) (examining consumer due process rights under a national health care system); THE
CENTER FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY. POSITION PAPER ON THE REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS IN

HR 3600/S 1757 (1994). See also Jost, Administrative Adjudication

Issues, supra note 211, at 14.
252. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.

254. 42 C.F.R. § 417.606 (1993).
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cal problems. Conceivably, every decision that a physician
makes could trigger an appeal. Clearly, such eventuality would
impede a frank and open physician-patient relationship required for a sound therapeutic environment. Further, would not
physicians have great incentives to proscribe the most intensive
services in order to limit litigation as is the concern about physicians practicing "defensively" to avoid malpractice litigation
and liability? Further, how would administrative appeals over
claims be distinguished from medical malpractice claims when
both would be predicated on decisions of physicians?
Another crucial issue is the point at which determinations
of medical appropriateness or necessity blend with clinical decision making. For example, a physician may decide that, although a service is covered, it is not medically necessary or appropriate in his/her clinical judgment for a given patient. In a
capitated system, incentives exist for physicians to make
clinical judgments that limit the provision of covered benefits.
This issue is compounded when a health plan makes a corporate decision, presumably to be more competitive from a cost
perspective, to define, as a matter of corporate policy, medical
necessity for particular conditions at levels less than is customarily provided under current practice. Such policies would presumably be based on clinical practice guidelines and be accompanied by efforts to get plan subscribers to agree by contract to
accept the medical practice guideline as the applicable standard of care for malpractice purposes.
CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND

DECISIONS. As part of challenges to claims or other issues
under health plans, individual consumers may want to challenge national or state policies and standards that constitute
the legal bases of adverse decisions. Most likely, coverage policies, utilization review standards, and underlying medical practice guidelines would be objects of such challenges. To the extent that these policies are state-wide, it would not be wise for
adjudicators in claim disputes to be able to invalidate these policies without some opportunity to defend these policies by the
responsible state or federal agency. The responsible agency
should have some opportunity to defend or refine the challenged policy or standard through augmentation of the record
in the claim proceeding or referral of the validity question to a
more centralized tribunal with a statewide or national
perspective.
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It is noteworthy that Congress created an explicit bar to
procedural challenges to the Medicare national coverage determinations in 1986, on grounds that current procedures of making national coverage determinations and the need to preserve
the scientific integrity of national coverage policy made APA
procedures unnecessary. 55 Congress also required courts to remand contested national coverage policies to the Secretary of
HHS for amplification of the record. 56 Courts have generally
upheld HCFA national coverage determinations, according
great deference to HHS and its expert decision-making process. 5 7 However, in 1987, the Administrative Conference of
the United States recommended changes regarding policy making for national coverage policy.255 Blocking consumer access to
adjudicating disputes, as Congress did with Medicare national
coverage policy, seems less desirable than forging an adjudication mechanism that permits presentation of disputes and seeks
resolution of disputes.
2.

Provider Disputes

There are three categories of anticipated individual provider disputes under health reform - payment, coverage, and
plan selection. The degree to which new arrangements for provider appeals may be necessary is dependent on how much
health reform legislation changes the current way in which
providers are organized and paid. A threshold issue is whether
to create a separate appeals system, independent of state or
federal court, for providers to bring disputes with health plans,
organizations responsible for regulating the insurance market,
or other parties.

255.

See supra note 178 and accompanying text.

256.

42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(3)(C) (1988 & Supp. TV 1992).

257. See, e.g., Friedrich v. Secretary of HHS, 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the HHS is to create national standards to ensure uniformity and equality in the
administration of Medicare); Goodman v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding

that the Secretary of HHS may regulate the Medicare program by enacting regulations
concerning Medicare reimbursement); Wilkins v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1989)
(deferring to the HHS Secretary's authority to interpret Medicare statutes).
258. Recommendation No. 87-8, supra note 179. See Kinney, National Coverage
Policy, supra note 179.
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The Bills

Most bills before the 103d Congress did not provide for a
separate appeals system for provider disputes. Presumably, bill
sponsors assumed that provider disputes over payment and selection would be private, contractual matters between providers
and payers that could generally be resolved in state court as
they are now. However, important issues remain about provider
disputes, namely the treatment of coverage and other policies
that have national policy implications, as well as remedies for
providers that have been excluded from regulated health plans.
The Mitchell bill, however, addressed provider appeals and
explicitly provided "due process" for health care providers. 59
Specifically, the bill required health plans to use "publicly
available standards for contracting with health care providers,"
as well as a "publicly available process" for dismissing providers or not renewing their contracts. 60 The hearing would be
conducted by the provider's peers within the health plan and
included, with the mutual consent of the provider and health
plan, a plan enrollee.261
b. Design Issues
WHETHER TO HAVE A SEPARATE PROVIDER APPEALS SYS-

A crucial threshold issue is whether even to have a separate appeals system for provider disputes over payment and
other issues. Further, should such an appeals system hear disputes over non-payment issues? Specifically, providers may
want to challenge coverage and other decisions and policies of
health plans and payers, particularly if denied payment for services already provided and precluded from recovering payment
from patients. Providers also may want to challenge an adverse
health plan coverage policy or even governing medical practice
guidelines prospectively on behalf of patients, particularly when
organized provider groups believe that coverage policy is inconsistent with good medical practice.
An important issue is whether providers should have rights
to challenge coverage policy at all, and if so, in what forum
TEM.

259. Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5516.
260. Id.
261. Id. § 5516(c).
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should such challenges be heard. It is noteworthy that under
the Medicare program, providers cannot bring challenges to
coverage policies on behalf of patients, except when contesting
adverse waiver of liability decisions. 62 If providers are able to
challenge coverage policy facially or in associated payment disputes, some mechanism should be available to refer coverage
issues of national importance to the state and/or federal oversight or other responsible agency in order to maintain consistent policy coverage in the state or nationwide.
ADJUDICATION OF PROVIDER DISPUTES OVER SELECTION
BY HEALTH PLANS. Provider disputes over health plan selection

policies and practices may be more prevalent than payment disputes. Many states now have "any willing provider" laws that
prohibit health insurers from excluding providers willing to
meet plan contract terms from participating in any state regulated health insurance plans. 263 However, these statutes would

probably be preempted by federal health reform legislation in
order to permit health plans to contract with specific providers
and achieve discounts needed in cost savings.26 4
Disappointed providers already have existing remedies
under the federal civil rights and antitrust laws respectively, if
selection policies and practices constitute proscribed discrimination or oppressive economic conduct.2 6 5 Nearly all states

have civil rights and antitrust laws that could govern such practices as well.2 6" Further, case law in some states essentially es-

262. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
263. Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable
Revolution, 5 YALE J. REG. 179, 195-89 (1988) (discussing state "any willing provider"
laws).
264. See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1993 § 1407; Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993 § 1432; Managed Competition Act of 1993 § 1222; Consumer
Choice Health Security Act of 1993 § 141; Affordable Health Care Now Act of 1993
§ 1203; Comprehensive Family Health Access and Savings Act § 1101; Health Reform
Consensus Act § 1203; Dole Compromise Bill § 201(a); Health Security Act of 1994
§ 1511; Bipartisan Health Care Reform Act § 6102.
265. See generally JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: STATE
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAWS. chs. 16L, 16M (1994 & Supp. 1994)(discussing provider rights and remedies under state antitrust laws).
266. See generally James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital
Peer Review, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1988)(outlining the application of antitrust
law to hospital peer review decisions regarding physicians); Clifford D. Stromberg, Health
Care Provider Networks: Antitrust Issues and PracticalSuggestions,in DEVELOPMENTS IN
ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE LAW 73, 84-86 (Phillip A. Droger et al. eds., A.B.A. Section of
Antitrust Law, 1990) (outlining protections under federal antitrust laws for physicians in
networks).
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tablishes due process requirements for physicians and, to a
lesser extent, other health professionals, who are excluded or
terminated from the medical staff of hospitals." 7 While these
due process rights will not automatically apply to health plan
decisions to exclude or terminate physicians, state courts may
find this body of case law analogous to the situation physicians
face under a reformed health care system.
D.

Judicial Review

A central issue is the degree to which consumers and providers may challenge decisions and policies under health reform
legislation in state and/or federal court. To many consumers
and providers, judicial review is perceived as the ultimate forum for assuring accountability of government or corporate actors. 2 8 If the federal enabling legislation does not address avenues for judicial review of responsible agency action, existing
law may cause undesirable consequences, such as making federal causes of action out of disputes that customarily would be
handled in state court. 269 As outlined above,2 70 affected parties
have rights under existing law and, to varying degrees, under
some health reform proposals to force the federal government
and states to comply with pertinent legislative requirements as
well as the constitutions of the states and federal government.
The policies and decisions of any federal oversight agencies clearly will generate opposition and judicial challenge. As
indicated above, these federal oversight agencies will be making policies and decisions about a wide variety of issues that
will dramatically affect the range and quality of health care
services that consumers receive and the payment that the providers receive for providing these services.2 1
Affected parties also will have concerns about policies and
decisions of states as they develop and implement state plans
267.
FINANCE

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.. THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND

154-55, n.2 (1991).
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Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 6; Sallyanne Payton, FederalJurisdictionaland
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270. See supra part II.C.
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called for under several health reform proposals. 2 Likely issues to be disputed are selection of organizations to regulate
the insurance market, boundaries of regulatory areas, selection
of health plans, regulation of health plans, and state compliance with federal requirements generally. An analogue for disputes over state plan elements are challenges to state plans for
the Medicaid program. 7 3 Because these policies and decisions
involve actions by state officials arising under federal law, section 1983 may provide a cause of action to consumers to challenge the state plan. 4
1. The Bills
Most health reform proposals before the 103d Congress
did not specifically address the rights to judicial review in state
and/or federal court for affected parties to challenge policies
and decisions of responsible agencies under the health reform
legislation. Thus, these proposals left consumers, providers, insurers, and other affected parties with the existing rights to
ju2 75
dicial review with associated remedies under current law.
Only the bills of President Clinton and Senator Mitchell
were specific about the remedies available for consumers, providers, and other affected parties. 27 6' The President's bill contained extensive provisions providing for judicial enforcement
of plan provisions in federal and state courts. Specifically, the
President's proposal authorized private rights of action to enforce state responsibilities as well as private rights of action to
enforce responsibilities of alliances. 7 The President's proposal
required that facial constitutional challenges to the health reform legislation be brought within one year of enactment, and
further provided for an expedited procedure for judicial review.2 78 Finally, the President's proposal explicitly provided

272.

See supra note 131 and accompanying text.

273. See Kinney, A Challenge to Federalism, supra note 47.
274. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
275. See supra part II.C.
276. Health Security Act of 1993 §§ 5231-5243; Mitchell Compromise Bill
§§ 5531-5543.
277.

Health Reform Act of 1993 §§ 5235, 5237. The bill also accorded private

rights of action to enforce federal responsibilities regarding operating the health reform in
a non-participating state. Id. § 5236.
278.

Id. § 5241.
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that existing judicial rights and remedies under current law
were not preempted. 79
However, the President's proposal provided only states and
alliances, but not consumers or providers, with a cause of action to review federal action and thus insulated such matters as
national benefits and coverage policy from judicial review.2 80
Further, the bill expressly precluded judicial review of any determination of the National Health Board regarding cost containment policy. 281 These limitations, combined with the widespread use of interim final rules to implement elements of the
reformed system, could have compromised the legitimate interests of consumers and providers in influencing the rules and
policies that would have affected them greatly under the health
reform legislation.
The enforcement provisions of the Mitchell bill were quite
similar to the President's. 8 2 Like the President's bill, the
Mitchell bill accorded consumers broad rights to bring actions
against state officials explicitly under section 1983 and without
regard to exhaustion of available administrative remedies. 83
Further, like the President's bill, the Mitchell bill expressly
preserved existing rights and remedies, and included some interesting provisions.28 4 Specifically, the Mitchell bill provided
explicitly for enforcement of consumer protections established
in other parts of the bill.285 It also expanded the remedies
against health plans available to essential community providers
as compared to the President's bill. 8 6
2.

Design Issues

The major issue regarding the range of judicial remedies
accorded affected parties in designing health reform legislation
is to determine the degree to which judicial remedies, particularly in federal court, are desirable given the need for expeditious implementation of health reforms. Further, to what extent
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. § 5243.
Id. § 5231.
Id. § 5232.
Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5531-5543. See Health Security Act of 1993

§§ 5231-5243.
283.
284.
285.

Mitchell Compromise Bill § 5534. See Health Security Act of 1993 § 5235.
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286. Id. § 5539. See Health Security Act of 1993 § 5240.
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are state and particularly federal judicial remedies desirable,
given the need of the state and federal governments, insurance
purchasing cooperatives, and health plans to implement the
health reforms? On the other hand, preclusion of judicial remedies cuts off important consumer rights, particularly to those
who are poor and often not well-represented in the political
process. 8 7
A crucial question regarding suits against insurance
purchasing cooperatives and health plans is whether they are
public or private bodies subject to suit in federal court. If their
actions are deemed to be state action for purposes of procedural due process and section 1983, then challengers have procedural due process rights that may enable them to bring challenges in federal court under section 1983. If health insurance
purchasing cooperatives and health plans are not state actors,
then challengers are left with causes of action in state court
under tort, contract and other state laws.
As many decisions and policies of responsible agencies will
be legislative in nature, challengers will not have due process
rights to hearings as they would with respect to adjudicative
decisions.28 However, to the extent that legislative-type decisions and policies are involved, the federal enabling legislation
should require states to provide legislative-type hearings at
which consumers and their advocates may express their views
about the content of policies and decisions that are ultimately
adopted in the state plan.
For disputes that concern policies and decisions of a more
legislative nature, the federal enabling legislation can provide
mandated input from all interested constituencies into the policy-making and decision-making processes. Such procedures
could involve public hearings and ombudsman offices. An innovative approach is negotiated rulemaking, which brings all parties to the table in a rulemaking procedure and involves their
contribution in a structured process before publication of the
28 1
proposed rule.
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288. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
289.
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CONCLUSION

In sum, there are various procedural options that can be
employed to protect the rights of consumer and providers under
any health reform legislation, regardless of its approach or ideological focus. For example, it is crucial to consider all the interrelationships among all procedural arrangements for rule
and policy making, disputes adjudication, and judicial review in
the health reform proposals, because the appropriateness of a
particular procedures may well depend on whether procedural
arrangements in other areas ameliorate what might be a harsh
provision from the perspective of consumers, providers, or other
affected parties. For example, a preclusion of judicial review of
a particular policy may be much more palatable if ample opportunity is accorded to affected parties in the development of
the policy. On the other hand, rules and policies made in expedited procedures that short circuit public input ought to be subject to subsequent challenge through administrative or judicial
review.
Finally, when it comes to the resolution of disputes, it is
crucial to look at the type of factual and legal issues involved in
the dispute in selecting the dispute resolution methodologies.
Disputes over policy should be confined to the rule and policymaking processes and kept out of courts when possible, given
the limited scope of review of policy, particularly at the federal
level, existing under current law.2 90 Consumer disputes over
claims should be resolved through expeditious procedures that
emphasize immediate and satisfactory resolution as offered by
some ADR techniques. Further, all dispute resolution and policy-making processes must have adequate mechanisms for ensuring access to accurate, unbiased, and timely input from
medical experts, other experts, and consumers.
Perhaps most importantly, the specific features of the procedure are less important than whether the options preserve the
core value of providing consumers and providers avenues to influence policies that affect them generally and challenge decisions that affect them individually without compromising the
integrity of the health reform system or its expeditious
implementation.
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